Parmenidean Argument Against The Validity And Coherency Of the Void And nothingness

• You say there is the void
• Therefore the void is not nothing
• Therefore it is not the void (nor nothingness)

 

 
Imo, both “a” and “the” signify singularity, that is, they both denote the fact that what's being spoken of is an individuated subject. So, if we are to re-phrase the argument by transplanting an “a” instead of a “the”, we really aren't changing, imo, anything. For, whenever we say or use, in common vernacular, “the”, we aren't necessarily inferring the existence of that designated subject, that individuated concept, spoken of, we are simply asserting that thing's objectified unity.
 
Now, mind you, this argument of Parmenides is supposed to be a refutation or denigrating of ancient atomists philosophy; the atomists who asserted that reality simply consists of indivisible particles aggregating and disintegrating within a void - or emptiness.
 
So, to be clear, Parmenides asserts his argument to ruin and undermine the logical coherence of ancient atomism, which stated that reality came, or comes, from nothingness or emptiness – a void. But, as Parmenides argued, if there really were a “void”, or nothingness, then there would not be nothing, i.e., a negation, subsequently, there would be no us to acknowledge the reality of it…

Btw, thanks for your initiating input, Effy.

 

You touch on a lot of salient points, Effy, espeically the point regarding the differentiation between actuality and abstract ideas, so let's go through them.
 
But ''a'' void can be said to exist as anything, ''the'' void, must be said to have an allocated margin of space wherein it exists. It cannot be that ''the'' void, does not exist in this context, for Parmenides has given it that privilege merely by referring to it as ''the'' void, whereas ''a'' void cannot be pointed out, by mere chance of it being ''a'' void, i.e, nothing. ''A void'', is different from, ''the void'', in the latter we have acknowledged something, in the former merely signified an idea.
 
What's the difference between “a man” and “the man”? You, Effy, would claim that the former is an abstract idea, whereas the latter is a direct assertion of an actual thing or being outside of and apart from abstract ideas; and, for the most part, I would agree, for, in the former sense, it's true, we haven't exactly determined what kind of man we are referencing - is it an Indian man, an African man, a short man, a tall man, a skinny man, a fat man, etc.,? While, in the latter sense, we are directly designating a specific man (whereby, you must notice that abstracts are referential, meaning, they may not be actual things or an actual thing, but they reference something actual - or are intended to).
 
Now, from here, let's be clear, Parmenides is not trying to refute an abstract idea, I mean, in a sense, he is, but rather, he is trying to refute the position of those who claim that this abstract idea is, in reality, an actual thing, being, or existence. Effy, you know, as well as I do, that there are many ideologies in the East, and in the West, such as ancient atomism, that assert the underpinning existence of a “void” or “nothingness” (or who purport reality in-itself to be “void” or “nothing”); so, to be sure, Parmenides deliberately starts his argument by writing, “You say there is the void”, because he wants to translucently express the fact that there is a specific person (in this case, an atomist) who's positively asserting the existence of a “void” or “nothingness” - beyond it being a mere idea.
 
In the case of this argument, ''the'', necessarily infers that ''the void'' exists, whereas ''a void'', merely posits an idea to us. Therefore, it cannot be said that by phrasing the beginning of the argument as ''You say there is a void '', that ''a void'' therefore exists. This is why the argument of Parmenides is one founded on syntactical error.
 
Yes, we can say that, “the” infers an actual thing directly perceived, whereas “a” posits a subjective idea. But, note, the actual thing inferred when one utilizes “the”, is, itself, based in subjective experience, i.e., subjective perception; so, in a sense, "the thing", whatever it is, is an idea - just not an abstract one.
 
''The void is not nothing'' - ''The void'' is not nothing, in that it has already been implied as being something that exists within some margin.
 
Exactly, so it is not “nothing”! For, how can non-being, i.e., nothingness, posses bounds? Do bounds not imply the bounds of something?
 
''A void'' is actually nothing,
 
Wait, I thought “a” void posits an abstract idea - so how can “a void” actually be? Whereas “the” denotes an actual existent?
 
in that the word ''void'', literally means ''nothing''.
 
How can a person determine that what they mean, personally, actually asserts the existence of what's meant by their words (outside of and apart from their personal thoughts or conceptions)?
 
''You say there is the void, therefore the void is not nothing, therefore it is not the void'' Can be translated with just as much meaning as the following; ''You say there is the lemon, therefore the lemon is not nothing, therefore it is not the lemon''.
 
Again, as you say, “the void” implies a bound or marginalization, so, as was just stated, a bounded or marginalized “nothing” is actually some-thing, and not “nothing”, because said margin is positively established, and is not negated or non-existent in its being (that's actually the gist of the argument).
 
Correspondingly, the lemon analogy is a false comparison, and I'll tell you why, it's because of the unintelligibility, and ambiguity, inherent within the word “nothing” or “void”.
 
If “nothing” or “void” are understood as terms denoting negation or non-existence, then you will see why the lemon comparison doesn't work... your very mention of “the lemon” refers to an individuated thing directly discerned by you, that is to say, a specific being actually perceived by you, and not an abstract idea, so, to say that your rendition of Parmenides' argument, which posits that, the lemon is, therefore it is not nothing, therefore it is not the lemon, is in tandem with Parmenides' reasoning would be to make a category mistake. For, the “nothingness” or “void” which is asserted by the atomists to be, is not directly or actually perceived by us, like the lemon is, but is only discerned within the imagination; again, the very topic or subject of the argument, i.e., "nothingness" or "void", starts as an abstract idea; so, to argue, in abstracto, that “a void” is, conveys, cognitively, that the void spoken of is not, by logical necessity, “nothing”, for, a marginalized void, which is, is not non-existent -- clearly, to have margins connotes existence.
 
“You say there is a void, therefore a void is not nothing, therefore it is not a void'', is completely irrational, in that ''a void'' is actually ''nothing'', by definition. Hence if we change but one word of Parmenides argument, then the syntactical foundation upon which it is entirely based, crumbles.
 
No, it's not irrational, infact, it's the exact the opposite, because if the void is, then reality is not void, for reality possesses bounds. Whereby, why isn't reality void of bounds?
 
"in that ''a void'' is actually ''nothing'', by definition" -- By definition, yes, it may be as such, or it may be conceded to be as such, but how can I know that your defintions are actuality indicative of anything besides your thoughts and abstract ideas? How do I know that "nothing" actually exists, or is, apart from thought and abstracts? Parmenides inquires...
 
I'm having difficulty with this, if there was nothing, then there would not be nothing?
 
If 'nothing' is, then yes, it is not “nothing”, i.e., it's not non-existent.

 

 
Again, Effy, I thank you for your intiating input.

 

 
In the sense that I had utilized, ''a man'', would not merely be an idea, but a tangible reality, whereupon a mind could actively browse, ''the man'', in the same sense, would obviously also be perceptible, the difference herein between ''a void'', and ''a man'', is that ''a void'', would not be perceptible, and could not be inferred to exist with any qualities, other than it's nothingness, which in itself is, in my mind, a word to describe the mere absence of qualities, whereas ''the void'', would be asserted to exist in the instant of the phrases use, and must be said to have it's own qualities, one being the margin's whereof ''the void'' exists.
 
Is a reality without any quality still a reality - and not non-existent?
 
Yes, but if that same person were to say, ''a void'' instead of, ''the void'', the perspective of Parmenides argument would point to something merely abstract and particular to human cognition, though we could grant it's existence in space-time nonetheless, and it would have to be concluded therefore, that this argument is one of semantics.
 
My friend, Parmenides, from my understanding, is making the point that "the void" is itself an abstract (and not just "a void").
 
''The void'' like ''the banana'', are both a collection of features, we cannot infer that they themselves exist without some showing of their own specific qualities, therefore ''the void'', I presume would be referenced by the acknowledgement of the borders and margins wherein it is bound. The fact that a subjective idea is informed by a real thing, is not entirely relevant, for I take both ''the void'', and ''a void'', to reference real things - the difference is that one asserts an acknowledgement of ''the void'', the other posits an idea of ''a void''.
 
But, "the void" is still, itself, an idea; granted, you may believe that your conception of this idea is a semblance of something that actually exists outside of and apart from your personal abstracts.
 
And, to the point about the features of object constituing said object, that is, that an "object" is merely a bundle of properties, I wouldn't disagree, but that doesn't have to do with why I believe that your lemon anaolgy is incorrect; I think your lemon is incorrect because a lemon is immediatley perceivable - or that the properties of a "lemon" are.
 
The bounds of nothingness would cease by the interception of tangible entities - but this is my quibble; Parmenides has asserted the tangible reality of ''the void'', by framing his argument thus.
 
What do you mean here?
 
It does posit an abstract idea, but a void (nothing), can still be granted to exist, though we cannot point to it, ''the void'', when we acknowledge it by the phrase, must by requisites be the object of our attention, therefore Parmenides has by acknowledging a void, as ''the void'', concluded it's existence.
 
No, friend, not by any means... I would argue that Parmenides is, as a matter of fact, treating the designated subject of "nothingness" as a contrivance of the mind. Similarly, I may accept, in abstracto, the qualitative requistes which makes a "unicorn" a "unicorn", but not accept that a "unicorn", in fact, exists.
 
As I said, ''the void'', has it's bounds acknowledged, ''a void'', has no such thing, and cannot be affirmed as existent.
 
Have you ever experienced this supposed void without bounds?
 
If one can acknowledge ''the void'', it is as much to say that one can acknowledge ''the lemon'', and that therefore because they have both been acknowledged, neither is non-existent.
 
I would beg to differ... and the unicorn example that I just gave should express why.
 
The term ''void'' refers to nothing, the term ''a void'', refers to a quality of nothingness. and the term ''the void'', acknowledges that nothingness.
 
If "void" refers to nothing, then how do you know that this term refers to something that actually exists? Also, what is "a quality of nothingness" without a thing by which said quality can be? How can the quality of heat exists without something that is hot? How can the quality of motion be without something that is moving? A quality without a thing in which said quality inheres is a mere chimera.
 
Not if ''nothing'' is an absence of qualities, though?
 
What is absent of qualities? The word "nothing"?

 

 
Yes, but it could not be said to be not non-existent.
 
Exactly... so it's a figment of one's imagination; whatever it may be considered.
 
I understand that, but it is merely from the phrase ''the void'' that Parmenides concludes his second two lines, and since these two words already grant something's existence as something, one cannot then say that they don't not exist as something, in the same way, the atomist could say that there is ''the void'', and you could respond with ''therefore you have concluded that the void exists as something'' - whereas if, and this is my original point, the atomist were to say there is ''a void'', one could not necessarily assert that the atomist has claimed a void to necessarily exist as something perceivable, for the atomist has merely posited an idea of ''nothingness'' and Parmenides could not then attack it as ''something that exists'' - for ''there is a void'', is not to say that there is something that exists, but merely nothingness, to say that ''there is the void'', is to say that there is the something which I can call the void.
 
His first line is phrased in the manner it is, because, again, he's refuting the position of the atomist who states that there is, in fact, a void - and we are living in it. Therefore, it should be noted, the atomists are not arguing for the reality of an idea of nothingness, but, in fact, they that we are in a or the void... that we are in "nothing"; and so, that's precisley why Parmendies can attack, from a purely logical basis, the notion of "nothingness".
 
But the phrase ''you say there is the void'', transfers the mere mental notion of ''the void'' into an existing something that occurs in some margin of space, (at least in lingual terms) - however ''you say there is a void'' does not infer that a void exists as something, other than it's nothingness, nor that it can be perceived.
 
If that phrasing doesn't infer the void existing as a something, that is, as an actual existence, and it cannot be perceived, why on earth would anyone would go on to aruge for the reality of this something that's non-existent and cannot be perceived? How can I ever come to determine that a non-existent something which cannot be perceived is an actuality - and not pure nonsense?
 
Yes, but if both the lemon and the void are acknowledged as something, it is one and the same to conclude that they both exist as something.
 
But again, they are being acknowledged in a categorically different way. Effy, you were the one who, in your second post, specifically demanded that we set a partition between abstract ideas and actual beings, were you not?
 
I understand that Parmenides may not think of ''the void'' as a real entity, but whether he entertains the notion of it as pure mental contrivance, or as a real thing that could exist, he has acknowledged it as something, whether this something is noetic or physical matters nothing, and from thence he has concluded it's existence as something and utilized his own conclusions as a semantic attack.
 
It really does, Effy. Imo, it really does.
 
If it didn't, then one could in turn conclude, based on your reasoning, that my mental projection of stabing somebody is no different than me actually stabbing somebody -- yes, techincally, both can be considered "real actions", but must we not recongnize their disparity? Or is there, in actuality, none?
 
I don't, if ''the void'' refers to nothingness however, I must say that I have acknowledged some features of it that would allow me to identify it's presence, hence acknowledging it's existence.
 
Yes, but, to be clear, you're cognitively acknowledging a cognition -- and not that your cogitative idea is a semblance of an actuality that exists outside and apart from your thought.
 

 
Is reality absent of an absence?
 
Consequentially, is a space bereft of bodies, void of being? Can something that is, in fact, bereaved, be non-existent, that is to say, if something is bereft of, must it not exist, in the first place, in order for it to be bereaved?
 

 
Is empty space void of being? Does empty space, in fact, exist? Consequentially, can "nothing" exist?

 

 
It's not about interpreting words... it's about interpreting what words signify.
 
"there is one hell of a fucking void.... in my fucking skull..... and none of the words you got for me will deny that shit....." - Good to know.
 
Have a good day, dingusus.

 

 
Well, your feelings are false.
 
"Distracted from anything resembling the "ideas" and stuck on different meanings of"the" -- Note, I was not the one who raised the problem with grammatical articles. Plus, you, in regards to the consideration of my opinion, have no idea of what you speak. But hey, what's new?

 

 
Next time, keep your two cents for yourself.
 
"Does it make you feel better to tell me how wrong i am...." -- I didn't tell you "how" wrong you were or are, overall or in-and-of-yourself, I just said that you're always wrong when critiquing and considering my opininon (go back, re-read without haste). Now, does it make you feel better to look at yourself as the victim? Why do you constantly feel that you're being antagonized? Did somebody play with your butthole when you were a little boy? Moreover, I wasn't attacking or rebuking you or your character, dingusus, no need to react, but you claim that I was, and that I am egotisitical for doing so, or at least you allude to this, yet, you, ironically enough, in your very first post, quite crudely demand of me, with a sort of prideful tone, to stop focusing on "shit" that's grammatical in nature... and you adamantly insist on how fixed up on words I am... basically telling me how wrong this whole thread is.
 
So again, keep your two cents to yourself, and don't come into a thread and act like your understanding is, in fact, credible and without inaccuracy. You speak nonsense... and now I'm kind of upset that I entertained your original post in the first place... cause I know you will respond to this post of mine... and so goes on your usual bullsh*t...