State of Washington v. James Barber Sr. case # 42669-2-II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON


JAMES E. BARBER SR. ) No. District Ct. I5340727
) No. District Ct. 2008129
APPELLANT, ) No . Superior Ct. 10-00109-6
) \t
) Motion for discretionary
v. ) Review
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
RESPONDENT, )


________________________________________________________________________________​_____

MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

________________________________________________________________________

James E. Barber Sr.


In Propria Persona



I. IDENTITY OF APPELLANT

James E. Barber Sr. asks this court to accept review of the superior court affirming of the

court of limited jurisdiction conviction finding that the court didn‘t commit any errors of

law in the proceedings validating an illegal contract under the corporate practice of

medicine doctrine, thus the search warrant was valid to seek medical records from THCF

in Oregon as the appellant never had services rendered in the state of Washington as

claimed by the state through Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical clinics

thereby dening the appellant his constitutional rights to any type of defense as if he was a

recreational user under strict liability crime, wherefore directly denying appellant his state

recognized property right' under RCW 69.51A.050(1) along with any attached defenses

and therefore denying his right to a fair trial . (Appendix A)

II. SUPERIOR COURT DECISION

Review is sought of the decision affirming Mr. Barber Sr' conviction and sentence a copy

is contained in appendix A.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW


1. Did probable cause exist to seize all of Mr. Barber' medicine (located in

trooper Wilson's marijuana seizure report ) and then charge him with a crime of only 9.59

grams in light of both RCW 69.51A.040 (1) and RCW 69.50.308(e) read in harmony :

RCW 69.51A.040 (1) :

If a law enforcement officer determines that marijuana is being possessed

lawfully under the medical marijuana law, the officer may document the

amount of marijuana, take a representative sample that is large enough to

test, but not seize the marijuana. A law enforcement officer or

agency shall not be held civilly liable for failure to seize marijuana

in this circumstance.

RCW 69.50.308 (e):

…or a lawful order of a practitioner, in order to be effective in legalizing

the possession of a controlled substance, must be issued in good faith for

a legitimate medical purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such

controlled substance.


Is this plain language above a presentment requirement read in harmony in which a

public premises defense would apply in this case, “ has complied with all lawful


conditions imposed on access“, if a person so complies, that person is “privileged

to…enter” and there is no “unlawful” entry” . The defense therefore negates an

element of the crime , and can not be deemed an affirmative defense because to do so

would relieve the state of the burden of it's proof thus negating reasonable suspicion a

crime leading into probable cause in this case existed ?


2. Did The Grays Harbor court judge(s) abuse their discretion on permitting the

government to present an illegal contract through the use of an alleged valid search

warrant to gain access to the courts criminal process against Mr. Barber Sr. to invalidate

his status as a already Deemed “Qualifying Patient” by 2 Washington state in the

County of Clark courts of limited jurisdiction which A state of Washington authorized

prosecuting authority was a party thereby prejudicing Mr. Barber from presenting any

defenses ?

3. Does the practice of medicine doctrine of the learned professions under Columbia

Physical therapy V. BFOA 228 P.3d 1260 (2010) (citing Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash.

486, 489-90, 82 P.879 (1905): Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wn.2d 555, 558, 756 P.2d 129

(1988) ) apply to Executive Director Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical

clinics thus voiding any and all on their face contracts of Paul Stanford dba THCF WA.

Alleged Valid Documentation signed by any THCF health care practitioners as

recognized in RCW 69.51A et. seq. and State v. Tracy 158 Wn.2d 683, 147 P.3d 559

(2006) ( The issue of the term “licensed” under RCW chapter 18.71) ?

4. Is a 1 yr. “valid documentation” restraint on speech Constitutional In light of Conant

v. Walters Injunction and a schedule 1 controlled substance ?


5. Did both courts in this case prejudice the appellant by applying the wrong facts and

misinterpret the law thereby committing reversible errors under due process of law as a

matter of law by ruling a repugnant illegal contract under public policy supersedes a valid

contract not repugnant to public policy ?


6. Do the facts in the records of this case warrant the issuance of a search warrant, for a

fishing expedition seeking irrelevant evidence from Mr. Barber Sr.' Oregon medical file

held in the custody of Paul Stanford dba THCF of Oregon under Oregon laws based on

his declaration admitting , to wit:


An illegal repugnant Washington state contract dated September 15, 2006 expiring on

September 15, 2007 of alleged medical records in the custody of Paul Stanford dba THCF

of Oregon acting in Washington state an illegal entity rendering services in Washington

state when the appellant never had services rendered in Washington state by Paul

Stanford dba THCF Washington, nor from his employees pursuant to RCW 69.51A or

any other laws of Washington state.? Should the search warrant have been issued for

Thomas Orvald of Yakima instead under the facts of this case or not at all ?


IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE HISTORY

In 2001 before the court of limited jurisdiction in the county of clark the appellant

appeared before Judge Randell Fritzler on a criminal matter. In the judgment and sentence

order of this criminal matter the judge addressed the appellants use of medical marijuana.

In the judges order it is written “no marijuana without prescription”. The appellant had a

valid recommendation in which the court at that time recognized from Toxicologist Dr

Phil Leveque of Mollala, Or. For Barrettes esophagus . For both Oregon and Washington .

In 2003 appellant saw Dr. Dodge for his Oregon mandated renewal card for cannabis

therapy treatment in the State of Oregon ( State v. Berringer, 234 Or.App. 665, P.3d 615

(2010) ruled a patient doesn't have to be a resident of the State of Oregon to qualify for a

medical marijuana card as long as they pay the required fees pursuant to the operative

language in the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.)

In 2004 after learning from news articles about Sharon Tracy' medical marijuana case

invalidating Dr. Dodge a non Washington licensed practitioner. The appellant had a non

Washington practitioner in his 2001 recommendation thereby invalidating appellants

lawful use under RCW 69.50.308(e) and RCW 69.51A.040(2). Appellant subsequently in

2003 as noted above seen Dr. Dodge for his Oregon Card mandated renewal from THCF

in Portland, Oregon. Appellant also sought his Wa. Recommendation as appellant is a

Washington resident and treats in Oregon also. This was in 2004 from Dr. Orvald before

he became an employee of Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical clinics of June

1, 2006. (Appendix B)

In early December of 2004 appellant was arrested with 9.73 grams, taken to jail and

charged with possession of less than 40 grams and Dr. Orvalds July 20th, 2004 (as no July

21st, 2004 documentation existed in the appellants medical file with Dr. Orvald)

recommendation was submitted to the law enforcement officer, the state and the court.

Subsequently in 2005 the state motioned for dismissal after appellant filed a notice of

affirmative defense and the state verified Dr. Orvald was licensed in wa. , verified his

authenticated signature (which is specifically written on the July 20th, 2004 valid

documentation ) and that the appellant had a qualifying condition of barrettes esophagus.

The appellant meeting his burden of proof under State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d at 237 thus

the state filled out and filed a IN REM property disposition for the 9.73 grams the

appellant possessed to be released back to the owner, the appellant apparently complying

with RCW 69.50.308(e) and RCW 69.51A.040(2) which presumably triggered RCW

69.51A.050(1) (The LAWFUL possession or manufacture of medical marijuana as

authorized by this chapter shall not result in the forfeiture or seizure of any property) as

lawful use and possession as appellant never had to file a 2.3(e) motion for return of

seized property . See appendix “C” This process would have apprised the appellant he

was not to have more than a 60-day supply and his use of cannabis was rendered lawful

for barrettes esophagus cellular change causing serious damage which could be life

threatening, RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a) cancer, not that the appellant would have to prove an

affirmative defense every time law enforcement wanted to seize the appellants property

and ask any prosecutor to file charges forcing a patient to run the legal gauntlet again to

prove the patient qualifies again, such as happened in this case . But, that the appellant is

now lawful and must possess no more than a 60-day supply to stay within lawful

privilege and lawful right to treatment with a said specific special class drug. see TP -Vol.

1 at 174-175.

Appellant' condition is located under RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a) which does not have

the restrictive statutory language unrelieved by standard medical treatment and

medications. The state in this case apparently is under the false impression appellant was

authorized under GERD per their research document from UCLA digestive department

which is under the restricted language either RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(b) Intractable pain ….

or (6)(f) Diseases,… which result in nausea, vomiting, or spasticity … Appellants

relevant scientific lab reports for his authorized condition is Barrettes Esophagus and not

GERD. A Nissen Fundoplication is not a standard medical treatment nor medications for

Barrettes Esophagus degenerative cellular changes already damaged but is for

suppressing the debilitating symptoms GERD Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease.

On September 15, 2006 appellant went to THCF Portland , Oregon and saw Dr. Orvald

for a renewal of his Oregon mandated card and also received a complimentary illegal

contract from Paul Stanford dba THCF of Washington using Dr. Orvald as an employee

for the same qualifying condition as his Oregon card was authorized in which appellant

never relied upon for any lawful use or possession nor an affirmative defense under RCW

69.51A.040(2). This document allegedly claimed to have an expiation date of September

15, 2007 and letterhead of THCF of Washington State located in Bellevue Wa. in which

the appellant had never visited nor received any rendered services from. How could

appellant logically or lawfully rely on such an illegal contract on it's face considering the

plain language of RCW 69.51A.060 (5) “ It is a class C felony to fraudulently produce

any record purporting to be, or tamper with the content of any record for the purpose of

having it accepted as, valid documentation under RCW 69.51A. 010 (7)(a) ? How would

any court explain it's reliance on such a fraudulent document to be accepted either to be

used by a defendant as an affirmative defense or for the state' ability to rely on the same

to prove an affirmative defense doesn't exist? The precedent case law on the practice of

medicine doctrine show' courts in the State of Washington do not entertain illegal void

contracts as they are repugnant to public policy and no legislative exemption exists ,

especially the type presented by the state from the appellants Oregon medical file as valid

and thus expired by a layperson passing himself off as a licensed professional rendering

lawful services through licensed employee‘s as of June 1st, 2006 as shown on the

Washington state business licensing check website:

https:/fortress.wa.gov/dol/dolprod/bpdLicenseQuery/lqsLicenseDetail.aspx?RefID=94227


On November 9th , 2007 appellant was pulled over in the county of clark subsequently

after leaving grays harbor county from a weekend stay after a hearing before judge

copland on the 7th of November 2007 in which his son James Barber Jr. was the petitioner

for a anti-harassment order against the chief of police from the city of Hoquiam cause #

Y7-2-D2341; See appendix “D”.


This pull over consisted of the officer claiming the appellant had a headlight out.

Subsequently the officer asked for the appellants marijuana he smelled on

his person in his jacket pocket (which had just been opened at home 10 minutes before

being pulled over) and I.D. . The appellant complied with both requests (as they was not

threatening demands as in this case by trooper Wilson). The officer also requested

appellants valid documentation in which appellant didn't have in his possession but, a

copy was given to the chief criminal prosecutor ( now retired) Dennis Hunter and the

sheriff commander ( whom has since died of brain cancer) in the appellants jurisdiction

on the above 2005 unrelated case in which appellant advised the deputy sheriff. The

deputy sheriff removed some of the appellants marijuana from the same POM jar in this

case at bar and kept the appellants drivers license and made no report of contacting the

appellant. Clark County case given by the court clerk is No. 207370P (the P standing for

probable cause hearing.)

The appellant contacted the chief criminal prosecutor Dennis Hunter and requested an

investigation into the removal of said property without authority of law, as this was the

3rd time appellant has had contact with local law enforcement in which appellants

cannabis was seized , yet no report of such occurred except appellant was charged with a

different crime, nothing at all, or which charges are subsequently dismissed due to the

appellant being the victim. The Chief criminal prosecutor suggested for the appellant to

file a claim. The appellant filed a declaration of probable cause with the clark county

court of limited jurisdiction requesting a hearing. Subsequently thereafter the sheriff

deputy mailed said drivers license back to appellant. Subsequently within days Trooper

Wilson pulled over a red truck for speeding in which he claimed to have visual and radar

contact along with appellant less than 1 car length in distance. Trooper Wilson pulled

over the red truck . Then motioned the appellant over for allegedly speeding also. The

trooper let the red truck occupants go without checking any of their information with

dispatch. The appellant was asked for his drivers license and registration only, from his

driver side window as the car was pulled over in a safe zone out of any traffic danger

which could pose a threat to the trooper. As the trooper approached the appellants car for

the issuance of the traffic citation , the trooper went to the passenger side window and

tapped on the window with his metal clip board for appellant to roll the window down. It

was at this point in which the trooper claimed to have smelled the marijuana and

unclipped his side arm while also yelling at the appellant to give the trooper all the

appellants marijuana now as he was under arrest. The appellant unsure as to why the

trooper unclipped his side arm at just the claimed smell of marijuana, the appellant raised

his hands and pointed at the glove box advising the trooper of such which contained a

sealed POM jar from the prior pullover and case filed with the court as evidence, and a

sealed baggie both containing the appellants medical marijuana. The trooper opened the

glove box and removed the POM jar and the baggie.


The appellant after realizing the officer wasn't going to use deadly force reached over to

the passenger seat in which he produced a certified file from the city of battleground court

clerk in which there was the 7/20/2004 redacted birth date valid documentation signed by

Dr Orvald in the appellants name. The appellant also had the biopsies and lab report with

pictures of his barrettes cellular changes in which he offered to show the trooper. The

appellant also had a non-redacted copy in his files in the back seat of his car in which he

offered the trooper to no avail.

The trooper took the marijuana and the medical marijuana valid documentation back to

his car to call for advise as this was his first medical marijuana encounter and had no

training as what to do when a medical marijuana patient is encountered. The trooper

contacted Chief criminal prosecutor Gerald fuller whom advised the trooper to seize all of

the appellants marijuana and his medical marijuana redacted valid documentation dated

7/20/2004 from Dr. Orvald. The appellant was advised Gerald fuller had instructed

trooper Wilson to seize appellants lawful property. Appellant was subsequently cited for

speeding and following to closely but not possession of the marijuana nor was the

appellant handcuffed, removed from the car nor taken into custody. The appellant was not

arrested but he was seized from leaving.

The appellant timely filed a notice contesting the officers actions. Subsequently the

appellant followed the process by the only notice given as to the seizure of appellants

property and alleged traffic offense. The appellant argued pretext at the hearing set by the

clerk of the court after allowing the state extended time for discovery purposes. The

appellant on February 26th , 2008 by the grays harbor district court was found not to have

committed the reason for the trooper' alleged contact in the first place on November 29th ,

2007. The state had 15 days to file a forfeiture notice since the trooper just seized the

marijuana without citing the appellant for illegal possession to trigger a reasonable

investigation for prosecution. The appellant was required to file a notice to comply with

the process served within 45 days, what ever process that may be in which , Appellant did

so comply with the only served process by the state of Washington. The state did not so

comply with due process per statute as seizure and forfeiture is statutory and must strictly

be followed. Nor did the state comply with due process in filing a appeal for error in the

record to the superior court from the hearing date of February 26, 2008. The appellant

gave the state over 30 days to file an appeal for error on the record, then the appellant

called chief criminal prosecutor Gerald fuller and asked when the appellant can come

pick up his medical marijuana. Gerald fuller stated he would get back to the appellant to

let him know.

Instead, the chief criminal prosecutor Gerald Fuller had already typed up an application

for a search warrant for the appellants alleged medical records from THCF wa. In

Bellevue, wa. claiming the Hoquiam police had informed trooper Wilson of an on going

investigation into appellants son for allegedly being responsible for appellant' portion of

a medical marijuana grow in the city of Hoquiam in which both the appellant and his son

filed a forfeiture case with the superior court cause # 07-2-148-1 and -149- to be heard

instead of the chief of police of the city of Hoquiam for a raid which took place on

November 26th, 2006 the appellants oldest sons birthday and the Grays Harbor prosecutor

office also sought a declaration from the illegal entity doing business, Paul Stanford dba

thcf wa. Medical clinics to gain access to the appellants Oregon medical records held by

THCF Oregon which is a legal entity under the state of Oregon laws in attempts too

thwart appellants claims of being a lawful using medical marijuana patient in Washington

by mixing the appellants Oregon medical records in attempts to look like appellants

Washington records from Dr. Orvald in Bellevue, wa. on the same day in which appellant

was seen in the state of Oregon for his Oregon card, not in the state of Washington city of

Bellevue. The appellant has never been seen in Washington state by any Paul Stanford

dba THCF clinic using licensed professionals as employee's.

On or about April 23rd of 2008 the state charged appellant with possession of less than 40

grams of marijuana by information, after doing a search warrant fishing expedition and

the court served process on appellant . The court denied all of the appellants motions filed

in this case on request for review, because the court is under the presumption the facts are

Executive Director of THCF Paul Stanford is a lawful licensed professional under the

corporate practice of medicine doctrine RCW chapter 18.71 (see State v. Tracy ) since the

state produced a quid-pro-quo declaration from him implying so. It was the state and

court relying on an illegal void contract to trump a legal contract. Both court' applied the

law to an illegal void contract precedent case law clearly shows courts refuse to entertain

them under the corporate practice of medicine thereby committing a constitutional

reversible error and ruling the appellant could not have complied with the requirements in

State v. Hanson presentation to any law enforcement official.


V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant James E. Barber Sr. appeared in response to the notice filed by trooper

Wilson for speeding and following to closely with Honorable Pro Tem Judge Stephan

Hyde presiding .Transcript of the contested proceeding (herein after TCP) - Vol. 1 at 2.

Appellant Mr. Barber argued pretext pull over before the court in regards to his

marijuana TCP- Vol. 1 at 15-21. The court found the traffic offense not committed by

appellant TCP- Vol. 1 at 21. The state did not appeal to the superior court for any claim

of error on the record.

The appellant James E. Barber Sr. appeared in response to the charge filed April 23rd,

2008 of possession of marijuana less than 40 grams on May 19, 2008, with Judge Brown

presiding. Transcript of the proceedings(herein after TP)-Vol. 1 at 3. Prior to his

appearance, on May 2, 2008, he filed a document captioned disqualification/ affidavit of

prejudice. Record on review(herein after RP). That document contained argument to

disqualify both district court judges for cause. Id. After hearing Mr. Barber‘s argument,

Judge Brown denied Mr. Barber's argument for causal disqualification. Id.- Order filed in

district court on May 19, 2008. Instead Judge Brown considered Mr. Barber Sr.' argument

as an affidavit for prejudice and disqualified himself pursuant to the court rule regarding

an affidavit of prejudice. TP-Vol. 1 at 32.

The next hearing was for arraignment and was held June 2, 2008 with Judge Pro Tem

Micheau presiding. TP- Vol. 1 at 59. Mr. Barber Sr. addressed several issues, and the

court informed him that proper motions should be filed to have those issues heard. Id. At

59-79.

The next hearing was held on June 23, 2008 with Judge Copland presiding. TP- Vol. 1

at 80. Mr. Barber Sr. argued that Judge Copland was improperly hearing the case. Id. At

82-92. Judge Copland refused to disqualify himself stating that he could be far and Judge

Brown was affidavit previously. Id. Mr. Barber Sr. also argued collateral estoppel based

on a prior case in Clark County, pretext based on the ruling at the infraction hearing noted

above, and argued for dismissal based on government misconduct. TP- Vol. 1 at 92-120.

Before argument was complete, the court had a break for lunch and the hearing was

continued. See Id. At 120.

The continuation of the June 23rd, 2008 hearing was held on July 14th, 2008 with Judge

Copland once again presiding. TP-Vol. 1 at 142. The major thrust of this hearing revolve

around Mr. Barber Sr.' 7/20/2004 valid documentation /Dr. Orvald contract vs. Paul

Stanford dba THCF wa. Medical Clinic/ 9/15/2006-2007 illegal void contract under the

medical marijuana act. Id. At 148-203 . Judge Copland took the matters from both the

June 23rd and July 14th, 2008 hearings under advisement . See Id. At 211. Judge Copland

provided his ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment A ~RA- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on July 7th, 2008 ( considering statutory

construction and determining that a physician has a right to limit the time of the

authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber's second authorization was expired on the

day of the violation herein and as such the first authorization was also expired and

consequently Mr. Barber could not avail himself of the medical marijuana affirmative

defense based on the information before the court at that point in time).

An August 18th, 2008 hearing with judge copland presiding addressed a motion by Mr.

Barber Sr. to reconsider the court's ruling stating Mr. Barber Sr. did not have a valid

authorization TP- Vol. 2 at 224. The court denied that motion. Id. At 232. The court also

entertained motions by he state. Id. At 233-309. The court took the matters under

advisement. Id. At 312. Judge Copland provided his ruling via letter to the parties.

Attachment B-RA-Letter from Judge Copland to the parties filed in District court on

August 21st, 2008 (denying Mr. Barber Sr.' motion to reconsider the court's denial of the

affirmative defense, but leaving the issue open).

March 13th, 2009 a hearing was held with Mr. Hamalian, attorney for Mr. Barber Sr.,

appearing and with Judge Copland presiding. See TP-Vol. 2 at 315. The defense motions

before the court dealt with issues regarding search warrant, collateral estoppels, the

medical marijuana affirmative defense, and other suppression issues. Id. At 317 The court

heard testimony from Mr. Barber Sr. and trooper Wilson. Id. At 317-414. Exhibits were

also introduced by both parties. Id. The court then heard argument from counsel. Id. At

414-466. After argument the court took the matters under advisement. Id. At 467-468.

Judge Copland provided his ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment C-RA- Letter

from Judge Copland dated March 23rd, 2009 to the parties and filed in District court

(denying motion to suppress based on traffic stop and seizure, denying collateral estoppel,

denying a motion to reconsider affirmative defense, denying motion regarding search

warrant).

On July 27th, 2009 Mr. Barber Sr.‘ motion to reconsider the affirmative defense was

held with Judge Copland presiding. TP- Vol. 3 at 480-490. The court denied the motion

to reconsider. Id. At 484. Mr. barber also requested a continuance to address search

warrant issues. Id. At 480-487. The court also granted a speedy trial waiver. .Id. At 488.

On November 30th, 2009 the jury was excused as the state had asked for a continuance

based on Mr. Barber raising the defense of mistake of fact. TP- Vol. 3 at 499-500 . The

court continued the case due to the new issue. Id. At 503. Mr. Barber then argued to

suppress the search warrant. Id. At 504-511. The court denied the motion. Id. At 511.

Jury confirmation, Judge Copland presiding, was held on February 8th, 2010 as was a

hearing to consider states motion regarding mistake of fact defense. TP- Vol. 3 at 513-

514. After hearing argument the court took that matter under advisement. Id. At 538. The

court issued its ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment D-RA- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on February 10th, 2010 (stating that the issue

here was a mistake of law, not fact).

Jury trial was held February 19th, 2010. TP - Vol. 3 at 540. Mr. Barber was found guilty

#of the charge of marijuana possession less than 40 grams. See Id. At 625.







VI. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED


Review of the issue(s) is this case should be accepted pursuant to RAP 2.3 (d)(1)-(4)

This is a case of 1st impressions as noted in Judge Copland's memorandum letter filed July

17, 2008 with the court clerk which states:

I have now had an opportunity to look more closely at some of the issues raised by the

parties in this case. “Not surprisingly, there does not appear to be any case law on point.”


RALJ 9.1 governs appellate review of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of a

district court. State v. Brokman, 930 P.2d 354 (1997). Pursuant to RALJ 9.1(a), an

appellate court shall review the decision of the district court to determine whether the

court has committed any errors of law. State v. Brokman, 84 Wash.App. At 850, 930 P.2d

354.

A defense not raised at trial can be raised for the first time on appeal for a reviewing court

to address it because it essentially challenges the sufficiency of the states evidence, an

issue of constitutional magnitude, and therefore can be raised for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 904 P.2d 754 (1995).


In State v. Fry, 228 Wn.3d 1 (2010) the Washington Supreme Court stated that “like” the

compassionate use defense” , self-defense is an affirmative defense. See City of

Kennewick v. Day, 11 P.3d 304 (2000) (quoting McBride v. Walla Walla County, 990

P.2d 967 (1999). Under this analysis an authorization does not negate probable cause.)


The Appellant urges this court in this case to analyze the compassionate use act under the

legal theory of criminal trespass/public premises defense. Under this analogy the

Appellant offers the proposition that an authorization does negate probable cause under

State v. R.H., 939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Finley, 982 P.2d 681 (1999) ( If the property

in question is a public place, however, a persons presence there is not unlawful as long as

the person has complied with “all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in

the premises.” ).

The public premises defense applies when the defendant has “complied with all the

lawful conditions imposed on access”. RCW 9A.52.090(2). If a person so complies, that

person is “privileged” to…enter” and there is no “unlawful” entry. See RCW

9A.52.080(1); RCW 9A.52.010(3). The defense negates an element of the crime, and

cannot be deemed an affirmative defense because to do so would relieve the state of it's

burden of proof. See, e.g., Lively, 130 Wash.2d at 10-11, 921 P.2d 1035.

RCW 69.51A.040 (2) Read in harmony with RCW 69.50.308(e)… lawful order of a

practitioner, in order to be effective in legalizing the possession of a controlled substance,

must be issued in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose (RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a)-

(f)) by one authorized to prescribe the use of such controlled substance,(RCW 18.71

chapter of specific health care practitioner in RCW 69.51A) Negates Probable Cause.


The element at issue here is of the same legal analogy as in the above cases, that is

whether Mr. Barber Sr. was “ licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter and

remain”. The state must disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, which they did

not. The state has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Barber Sr. was NOT

licensed, invited, and was NOT privileged to so enter and remain a qualifying patient

because the 2006/2007 Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic contract is illegal

leaving the court ruling an illegal contract is valid, which is utterly contrary to

Washington State precedent case law and current public policy. Thus is an absurd,

strained result requiring a finding of abuse of discretion by this court. Otherwise, “one

would be guilty of trespass by returning to property after being unjustly ordered to vacate

it. That the law does not condone.” State v. R.H.,


Hence,… this leaves Mr. Barber Sr. 7/20/2004 already ruled upon by a prior judicial

Order valid documentation as the states only evidence, the state was required to prove

Mr. Barber Sr. had more than a sixty day supply as the prior court order was dismissed

without prejudice. It is paramount too the amount reasonable for a 60-day supply in rem

is the required elements , not that his authorization is invalid or that he doesn't have a

qualifying condition of barrettes esophagus cellular changes which removes the status of

Mr. Barber Sr. qualifying condition due the fact it would no longer qualify under the act .

. Under the state and courts analysis one would be guilty of trespass by returning to the

property after being unjustly ordered to vacate it. See RCW 69.51A.060 (1)- (6) crimes

and limitations of chapter. That, the law does not condone. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); State v. R.H., .
Authority to define crimes and set punishments rests firmly with the legislature,. State v.
Wadsworth, 139 Wn.2d 724, 734 991 P.2d 80 (2000).
Specifically, the legislature is responsible for defining the elements of a crime. State v.
Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 447 n.2, 114 P.3d 627 (2005); Wadsworth, 139 Wn.2d at 735.
The elements of a crime are those facts that the prosecution must prove to sustain a
conviction”. State v. Miller, 15 Wn.2d 23, 27 123 P.3d 827 (2005) (quoting Blacks law
Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004). “ An ‘essential element is one whose specification is
necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior'”. State v. Tinker, 155 Wn.2d
219, 221, 118 p.3d 885 (2005)(quoting State v. Johnson, 119 Wn2d. 143, 829 P.2d 1078
(1992) ).
It is a standard rule of construction that what is not expressly mentioned is intentionally

excluded. Bour v. Johnson, 122 Wn.2d 829, 836, 864 P.2d 380 (1993). The penal

criminal part of the statute does not contain any 1 yr. mandate to renew nor any expiration

date of a condition. See RCW 69.51A.060 (1)-(6).


In The case of United States v. Wlitberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820), the rule that penal laws are

to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded

on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that

the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is

the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.

The law should not be construed to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.

Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175, 192, 17 L. Ed. 520 (1864) (“It is

almost unnecessary to say, that what the legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do

indirectly. The stream can mount no higher than its source.”);

W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 516, 12 L. Ed. 535 (1848) (“All the

powers of the states, as sovereign states, must always be subject to the limitations

expressed in the United States Constitution … . What is forbidden to them, and which

they cannot do directly, they should not be permitted to do by color, pretence, or oblique

indirection.”)
Appellant James E. Barber Sr. followed the law, reasonably relied on a judicial order,
reasonably relied on the state prosecuting authority in rem property disposition filed
document in regards to RCW 69.51A.050 (1) The “lawful possession” or “manufacture”
of medical marijuana as authorized by this “chapter” shall not result in the forfeiture or
seizure of any property.
To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due
process violation of the most basic sort. See North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at 738 (opinon
of Black,J), and for an agent of the state to pursue a coarse of action whose objective is to
penalize a persons reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, supra, at 32-33.n. 20
In general, a trail court must instruct on a party's theory of the case if the law and the
evidence support it; failure to do so is reversible error. State v. May, 997 P.2d 956 (citing
Birdwell, 6 Wn.App. 284, 297, 492 P.2d 249 review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1009, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 973, 93 S.Ct. 346, 34 L.Ed.2d 237 (1972)), review denied, 142 Wn.2d 1004, 11
P.3d 825 (2000).


Ordinarily, a reviewing court treats unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal.

See State v. Noble, 144 Wn.App. 812, 817, 60 P.3d 1224(2003). However, an appellate court

may excuse a party's failure to assign error where the briefing makes the nature of the

challenge clear and the challenged finding is argued in the text of the brief. See Noble, 114

Wn. App. At 817; RAP 1.2(a).



The disposition of guilt in this case must therefore be reversed and the case dismissed

with prejudice.





Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state may not

"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ." U.S.

Const. Amend. XIV. The due process clause (along with the Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process) guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present

a complete defense. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 3 19 at 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727,

164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006). This includes the right to introduce evidence that is relevant

and admissible. State v. Lord, 16 1 Wn.2d 276 at 301, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). Denial of

this right requires reversal unless it can be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not affect the verdict. State v. Elliott, 121 Wn.App. 404 at 410, 88 P.3d 435

(2004). In evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient to support a defense,

trial court must interpret the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendant. State v.

Ginn, 128 Wn.App. 872 at 879, 117 P.3d 1 155 (2005). RCW 69.5 1A.040 creates an

affirmative defense to crimes "relating to marijuana." Under the statute, "any Qualifying

Patient who retains “valid documentation“ from a Washington licensed professional for

an appropriate condition defined in RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a)-(f) , will be deemed to have

established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance

with the requirements provided in this chapter." RCW 69.5 lA.040(2).

In this case, the provisions relating to "valid documentation" are a main issue. See

Attachment A- Letter from Judge Copland to the parties filed in Disrict court on July 17th,

2008 (considering statutory construction and determining that a physician has a right to

limit the time of the authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber Sr.' second authorization

was expired on the day of the violation alleged herein and as such the first authorization

was also expired and consequently Mr. Barber Sr. could not avail himself of the medical

marijuana affirmative defense based on the information before the court at that point in

time). Among other things, a “Qualifying Patient” must "[plresent his or her valid

documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient or provider

regarding his or her medical use of marijuana." See e.g. State v. Hanson, 138 Wn.App.

322, 157 P.3d 438.

RCW 69.5 lA.040(3)©.

Valid documentation includes "[a] statement signed by a qualifying patient's

physician, or a copy of the qualifying patient's pertinent medical records, which

states that, in the physician's professional opinion, the potential benefits of the

medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the health risks for a particular

qualifying patient.. ." RCW 69.5 1 ~ . 010( 5)(a).~

Proof of identity such as a Washington state drivers licensed or identicard, as defined in

RCW 46.20.035 . RCW 69.51A.010(5)(b)~

RCW 46.20.035 (1)(b) :

A Washington state identicard or an identification card issued by another state.


A. Dr. Orvalds 7/20/2004 declaration qualifies as "valid documentation" under RCW

69.51A.010(5)(a). A Unlicensed layperson sole shareholder Paul Stanford

dba THCF Washington clinic using licensed professionals to render services “purporting

to be valid documentation” does not so Qualify as they are illegal contracts under

Washington state precedent case law of Columbia Physical Therapy v. BFOA, 168

Wash.2d 421, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010) (citing a South Carolina Supreme court decision

which argued that commercialization of professions would destroy professional

standards and that the duties of professionals to their clients are incompatible with

commercial interests of business entities. Id. At 331-32, 135 P2d 839 (citing Ezell v.

Ritholz, 188 S.Ct. 39, 198 S.E. 419, 424 (1938). At bottom, the doctrine exists to protect

the relationship between the professional and the client ; See RCW 69.50.308(e) … “An

order purporting to be” a prescription not in the course of professional treatment is not a

valid prescription or lawful order of a practitioner within the meaning and intent of this

chapter. See e.g. State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 228 P.3d 1 (2010)

The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State Owned Forests v.

Sutherland, 124 Wn.App. 400 at 409, 10 1 P.3d 880 (2004). The court's inquiry "always

begins with the plain language of the statute." State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186 at

194, 102 P.3d 789 (2004). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must

give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Sutherland, supra,

at 409; see also State v. Punsalan, 156 Wn.2d 875 at 879, 133 P.3d 934 (2006) ("Plain

language does not require construction.") The plain language of RCW 69.51A.010(5)(a)

does not require documentation to contain the exact language of the statute; nor does it

require documentation to be substantially in the form of the statute. The operative language-

"[a] statement.. . which states that.. . "- says nothing about "exact language" or "substantial

compliance." Nor does the definition contain any other words restricting "valid

documentation" to those statements containing particular phrasing or format. From this, it

can be presumed that such restrictions of a 1yr. expiration date are not intended. Sutherland,

supra; Punsalan, supra.

Instead, under the plain language of the statute, a doctor's statement that generally conveys

the required information-that the benefits of marijuana outweigh the health risks-qualifies as

"valid documentation." The same result would apply even if the statute were determined to

be ambiguous. First, it is an "elementary rule" of statutory construction that the use of certain

language in one instance and different language in another establishes a difference in

legislative intent. Spain v. Employment Sec. Dep't, - Wn.2d , 185 P.3d 1188 (2008). The

legislature has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of imposing inflexible requirements

on written documents, going so far as to regulate style and font size in some contexts. See,

e.g., RCW 10.96.020 ("Criminal process issued under this section must contain the following

language in bold type on the first page of the document.. ."); RCW 26.09.165 ("All court

orders containing parenting plan provisions or orders of contempt, entered pursuant to RCW

26.09.160, shall include the following language.. ."); RCW 47.36.200 ("[Tlhe department

shall adopt by rule a uniform sign or signs for this purpose, including at least the following

language, 'MOTORCYCLES USE EXTREME CAUTION"'); RC W 64.36.028 ("The

timeshare interest purchase agreement must contain the following language in fourteen-point

bold face type.. . "); RCW 70.95.630 ("A person selling vehicle batteries at retail in the state

shall.. . Post written notice which must be at least eight and one-half inches by eleven inches

in size and must contain the universal recycling symbol and the following language. . . ").

The legislature has also repeatedly imposed a requirement that certain notices and other

documents substantially comply with a particular statutory form. For example RCW

6.21.030, RCW 7.08.030, RCW 9.96.020, RCW 9A.16.110, RCW 11.40.030, RCW

17.28.100, RCW 18.27.114, RCW 19.138.040, and RCW 28A.343.330 all require notices

and other documents to be "in substantially the following form.. ." The difference between

the medical marijuana act's definition of "valid documentation" and the wording used in the

numerous statutes referenced above establishes that "valid documentation" need not contain

specific time limiting language, or be substantially in a particular time limit form. Spain v.

Employment Sec. Dep't, supra. Accordingly, the plain language of the statute allows doctors

-to draft "valid documentation" using their own phrasing and terminology. Second, a

fundamental rule of statutory construction is that courts must interpret legislation

consistently with its stated goals. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 20 1 at 211, 5 P.3d 691

(2000). The goal and purpose is not to allow for “prescriptions” as cannabis is a schedule 1

controlled substance thus the substance is not available in any pharmacy wherefore, no

healthcare practitioner can “prescribe” regardless of state law allowing it's specific personal

use. In otherwords, Federal Preemption applies as the field is fully occupied. Cannabis can

only be recommended as a lawful order of a practitioner in the use of treatment for specific

covered conditions under state law but, not can not be “prescribed.

To ascertain legislative intent, courts look to the statute's declaration of purpose. Donohoe v.

State, 135 Wn. App. 824 at 844, 142 P.3d 654 (2006). Such declarations are "useful in

determining how the legislative body intended the entire statute to operate," and "can be

crucial to the interpretation of a statute." Food Servs. ofAm. v. Royal Heights, 123 Wn.2d

779 at 788,871. RCW 69.5 1A.005 sets forth the purpose and intent of the medical marijuana

act, and reads as follows: The people of Washington [Sltate find that some patients with

terminal or debilitating illnesses, under their physician's care, may benefit from the medical

use of marijuana. Some of the illnesses for which marijuana appears to be beneficial include

chemotherapy-related nausea and vomiting in cancer patients; AIDS wasting syndrome;

severe muscle spasms associated with multiple sclerosis and other spasticity disorders;

epilepsy; acute or chronic glaucoma; and some forms of intractable pain. The people find

that humanitarian compassion necessitates that the decision to authorize the medical use of

marijuana by patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses is a personal, individual

decision, based upon their physician's professional medical judgment and discretion.

Therefore, the people of the state of Washington intend that: Qualifying patients with

terminal or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians, may benefit from

the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law for their

possession and limited use of marijuana; Persons who act as designated providers to such

patients shall also not be found guilty of a crime under state law for assisting with the

medical use of marijuana.. . RCW 69.51A.005. The phrase "valid documentation" should be

interpreted broadly to ensure that legitimate patients "shall.. . not be found guilty of a

crime." RC W 69.5 1 A.005. Tunstall v. Bergeson. Accordingly, documentation that implies

rather than states a physician's professional opinion that the potential benefits of marijuana

outweigh the health risks must fit within the definition. Tunstall v. Bergeson. Third, the rule

of lenity requires criminal statutes to be construed in the manner most favorable to the

accused person. State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1 at 17, 186 P.3d 1038 (2008); State v.

Jackson, 61 Wn.App. 86 at 93, 809 P.2d 221 (1991). The policy underlying the rule of lenity

is "to place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people

of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are."

Jackson, supra, at 93. Applying this rule, the statute must be read to allow for "valid

documentation" that varies from the language of the statute, remembering the statute is silent

as to any “specific” time constraints and not silent under RCW chapter 18.71. See State v.

Tracy.

In this case, the documentation consisted of a certified court document with the birth date

redacted with an authenticated signature dated in 2005 signed by Dr. Thomas Orvald M.D.,

there is no letterhead designation that it purports to be anything other than from Dr. Thomas

Orvald M.D. ONLY . The Valid documentation reads, in relevant part, that Mr. Barber Sr.

was advised the medical benefits outweigh the risk.. Taken in a light most favorable to Mr.

Barber Sr., this declaration qualifies as "valid documentation," because the required

professional opinion is implicit in Dr. Orvald' declaration. Ginn, supra. A reputable

physician would not write that a patient "should be able to use marijuana for Barrettes

Esophagus" if the doctor believed that the medical benefits did not outweigh the risk.

The trial court held that Dr. Orvald' 7/20/2004 Declaration "did not conform to the statute as

it had expired due to a subsequent repugnant to public policy illegal void contract and, by

itself, is insufficient to raise any allowed defense.. See Attachment A- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on July 17th, 2008 (considering statutory

construction and determining that a physician has a right to limit the time of the

authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber Sr.' second authorization was expired on the

day of the violation alleged herein and as such the first authorization was also expired and

consequently Mr. Barber Sr. could not avail himself of the medical marijuana affirmative

defense based on the information before the court at that point in time).~This was error.

Dr. Orvald' 7/30/2004 declaration qualified as "valid documentation," and should have

permitted Mr. Barber Sr. to raise a defense. The court was mandated to rule Paul Stanford

dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic' is illegal Morelli 110 Wash.2d at 556, 756 P2d 129 . In the

course of the finding that the partnership was illegal, the court noted “the common law rule

that a corporation cannot engage in the practice of a learned profession through licensed

employee' unless legislatively authorized.” Id. At 561, 756 P.2d 129. and may not render

professional service through licensed employee' ; See also e.g. Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash.

486, 82 Pac. 879, 111 Am. St. 922, 2 L.R.A (N.S.) 392 :

Stripped of all subterfuges and pretenses, this is nothing more than a

contract on part of the appellant Lawson to render professional services

for the respondent, a contract he could not perform without violating the

laws of the state. The contract was therefore against public policy, and is

utterly void.”

The court was mandated not to entertain a repugnant to public policy contract thus rule it

null and void. This is consistent with the general rule that illegal agreements are void, and

courts will not enforce them. See Brower v. Johnson, supra; Williams v. Burrus, 20

Wn.App. 494, 497, 581 P.2d 164(1978); 17 Am. Jur.2d conracts 216, at 584-85 (1964).

Allowing the court to enforce a repugnant to public policy contract would, in effect,

sanction the illegal corporation and allow the enforcement of an illegal agreement. See

e.g. Baugh v. Dunstan & Dunstan, inc., 67 Wn.2d 710, 409 P.2d 658 (1966).


The doctrine of informed consent, which is premised on the principle that “every human

being of adult years and of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with

his/her own body .'” reflects judicial recognition of the critical importance of this right.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), (quoting Schloendorff v.

Soc'y of new york hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)). See

also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (doctrine of

informed consent is “firmly entrenched in American tort law”). To ensure that patients

can exercise this right, the informed consent doctrine requires physicians to provide

patients sufficient information and advice necessary to “evaluate knowledgeably the

options available and the risks attendant upon each”. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772, 271.

Physicians must offer enough medical information and advice to give a patient

“familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards.” Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d

229, 243 (Cal.(1972); see also American Medical Association, code of medical Ethics

120 (1996-1997) (“AMA Code of Medical Ethics”.)


Perhaps more significantly, patients have a constitutional right to receive all information

and advice that the physician sincerely and reasonably believes is relevant to the patients

condition and which he/she wishes to convey. Thus, in the medical context, as in other

areas, the listeners right to receive information from a willing speaker is paramount. See,

e.g. First Nat'l bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) ( the First Amendment “prohibits

government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public

may draw”); Virginia state bd. of pharmacy v. Virginia citizens consumer council, 425

U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment “protection afforded is to the communications, to its

source and to its receipts both”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (it is “now well

established that the constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas”).

This information and advice which patients do not have and cannot easily obtain. If

physicians cannot share the recommendations and advice they reasonably believe are

relevant to their patients condition, those patients first amendment rights are infringed, as

are the rights of the physicians to inform, recommend, and counsel their patients

according to their best medical judgment.


Conant v. McCaffey, No. C 97-00139 (2000), upheld by Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629

(2002) is in opposite to a 1 yr. expiration date as to one of self- censorship under a schedule 1

classification unregulated drug to be restricting view-point and content-neutral speech.

Given the doctrine of constitutional doubt, the Governments and Courts construction of the

act can not stand. If the legislature chose to enact a 1 yr. restriction without rescheduling

cannabis to a schedule III or less due too the same efficacy of marinol which is a schedule

III, this would be unconstitutional to be abridging the rights of both patient and physician

rights to speak about an unclassified drug without infringement.


In another most recent pronouncement on regulating speech about controlled substances,

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), the supreme court found

that provisions of the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 that restricted physicians

and pharmacists from advertising compounding drugs violated the first amendment. Id. at

1500. The court refused to make the “questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe

unnecessary medications” and rejected the government's argument that “people would make

bad decisions if given the truthful information about compounded drugs.” Id. at 1507.


The court should take note of the abomination noted in Thompson: “If the first amendment

means anything, it means that regulating speech must be the last- not first- resort. Yet it

here, It seems to have been the first strategy of the Government and Court . Such strategies of

condemnation of particular views is especially troubling in the first amendment context.

“When the Government and Court targets not subject matter but particular views taken by

speakers on a subject, the violation of the first amendment right becomes all the more

blatant.” Rosenburger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Indeed, even content-based

restrictions on speech are “presumptively invalid”. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).


A-1. The appellant James E. Barber Sr. presented trooper Wilson a law

enforcement officer/official with a current valid copy of his Washington state

identicard which was verified by grays harbor dispatch. Hence, satisfying all

required element(s) to establish all defenses available to any similarly situated

person. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE STATE'S

MOTION IN LIMINE AND THEREFORE REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT

TO ADMIT EVIDENCE AS A QUALIFYING PATIENT UNDER THE MEDICAL

MARIJUANA ACT. ?


The Appellant assigns error to the trial courts order granting the

State's motion IN LIMINE. The motion IN LIMINE prohibited the Appellant

from disclosing evidence regarding any authorization to possess marijuana

under the Medical Marijuana Act. This act prejudiced Mr. Barber Sr. from being allowed any

defenses at all.

"A motion IN LIMINE is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance

testimony or evidence in a particular area." State v. O'Connor, 155 Wash.

App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010). The appellate court reviews such a

decision under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. O 'Connor, 155

Wash. App. at 290; State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792,810,975 P.2d 967

(1999).

"An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision or order of the

court is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable

reasons. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675,679-80,974 P.2d 828 (1999).

Under the Medical Marijuana Act "qualifying patients with terminal

or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians

( not a layperson circumventing the laws of the state), may benefit

from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a

crime under state law for their possession and limited use of marijuana." RCW

69.51A.040(2).

Under Washington State law, a person falls within the statutory

protection of the Medical Marijuana law and therefore can present it as an

affirmative defense if he/she :

(1) meets all the criteria for status as a qualifying patient,

(2) possesses "no more marijuana than is necessary for the

patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount for a sixty-day

supply" and

(3) "presents his or her valid documentation to any law

enforcement official who questions the patient or provider regarding his

or her medical use of marijuana." RCW 69.51A.040(1) (emphasis added)

(4) Presents some for of I.D. such as an example a Wa. State I.D. card.


In this case, it is clear from the entire record that the trial judge granted the

motion IN LIMINE that prohibited the Appellant from raising any reasonable

defense because Judge Copland statutorily believed Mr. Barber Sr. did not fall

within the legal boundaries of RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a) cancer, because of the

illegal contract of Paul Stanford the state produced under false pretenses as an offer of proof

of probable cause as reasonable suspicion Mr. Barber Sr. committed a crime of possession

of cannabis without any exemptions under RCW 69.50.308(e) which reads:

“Lawful order of a practitioner to be effective in “legalizing” the possession

of a controlled substance, must be issued in good faith for legitimate medical

purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such controlled substance.


The court took the illegal contract produced by the state from the medical records

unlawful seized from the State of Oregon without due process of law as meaning the

latter part of this statute, which further reads:

“ An order purporting to be a prescription not in the course of professional

treatment is not valid or lawful order of a practitioner within the meaning

and intent of this chapter: and the person who knows or should have known

that the person filling such an order, as well as the person issuing it, can be

charged with a violation of this chapter.

The trial court denied Mr. Barber Sr. his rights and privileges under ER 402 which reads:

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by constitutional

requirements or as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or other rules or

regulations applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.”


Thus, was not a harmless error and prejudiced Mr. Barber Sr. by denying him any defense

what so ever.. Criminal defendants have a right to have their defenses heard. State v.

Lord, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)(citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); accord

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ((1973). And the right to a jury trial on the merits

must remain inviolate. WA. CONST. Art. 1 sec. 21.

Evidentiary error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that but for the error,

the outcome of the trial would have differed. In re Det. Of Post, 170 Wn.2d 302, 314, 241

P.3d 1234 (2010). (quoting State v. neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 611, 0 P.3d 1255 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If not for the Evidentiary error(s) made by the trail

court, the outcome would have surely been different as allowing Mr. Barber Sr. to

present his 7/20/2004 already deemed valid documentation as qualifying threshold of his

meeting of the burden of proof in a medical marijuana case in Washington state.

See State v. Janes, 121Wn.2d at 237; e.g., State v. Locati, 43 P.3d 1288; 2002.

Reasonable reliance is an element of the estoppel defense. Barker, 546 F.2d at 940;

Lansing, 424 F.2d at 225. Thus, it should be deemed a defense under such

 

legal analogy

of the public premises defense found in the criminal trespassing laws as privileged to

enter and so remain which is not unlawful conduct and negates reasonable suspicion

leading to probable cause a crime has been or is about to be committed. See e.g., State v.

R.H.,939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Green, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010) State v. Lively, 921

P.2d 1035 (1995).

A trial court abuses it's discretion when it adopts a position that no reasonable person

would take, when it applies the wrong legal standard, or when it relies on unsupported

facts. Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wn.2d 664, 669, 230 P3d 583(2010).



The Court abused it's discretion in allowing a illegal contract which is repugnant of

clear Washington public policy of the corporate practice of medicine, supersede a legal

contract . See e.g., Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc., v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic

associates, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010), .

Thus, this case should be reversed as it qualifies as a absurd result, the court should find

the state committed egregious misconduct under rule 8.3 and dismissed this case with

prejudice.



C. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence from the fishing

expedition general search warrant which caught an irrelevant illegal repugnant to public

policy contract exclaiming some legislative exemption which the court ruled as valid.



The Washington constitution provides that, “ No person shall be disturbed in his private

affairs without authority of law. Const. Art. 1 sect. 7




The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Const. states:

[T]he right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation….



A search warrant may issue only upon a determination of probable cause. State v. Cole,

128 Wn.2d 262, 906 P.2d 925 (1995). An application for a warrant must state the

underlying facts and circumstances on which it is based in order to facilitate a detached

and independent evaluation of the evidence by the issuing magistrate. State v. Smith, 93

Wn.2d 329, 352, 610 P.2d 869(1980); State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 92-93, 542 P.2d

115 (1975). Probable cause exists if the affidavit in support of the warrant sets forth facts

and circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that the defendant is

probably involved in criminal activity and the evidence of the crime can be found in the

place to be searched.” State v. Goble, 88 Wn.App. 03, 509, 945 P.2d 263 (1997) (citing

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 3.7(d), at 372 (3d ed. 1996)).

Assuming arguendo, In finding reasoning of Rangitsch, Dalton, Olson, and Goble, and

similar cases from other jurisdictions, should be persuasive. These cases are consistent

with the Washington Supreme Court requirement that a finding of probable cause must be

grounded in fact. State v. Cole(1995); State v. Smith(1980); State v. Helmka (1975). This

requirement is constitutionally prescribed because information that is not sufficiently

grounded in fact is inherently unreliable and frustrates the detached and independent

evaluation function of the magistrate. See, e.g. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 436-37,

688 P.2d 136 (1984) (magistrate cannot perform constitutionally prescribed function

unless affidavit includes underlying facts); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 907, 632 P.2d

44(1981) ( it is the duty of the issuing magistrate to independently judge the

persuasiveness of the evidence in order “to ascertain whether the warrant sought is being

reasonably requested and on reasonable grounds.”); Smith, 93 Wash.2d at 352 610 P.2d

869 ( application for warrant must state underlying facts and circumstances on which it is

based).

Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will

likely be found at a place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter

of law. See, e.g. Smith, 93 Wash.2d at 352, 610 P.2d 869 ( “if affidavit or testimony

reveals nothing more than a declaration of suspicion and belief, it is legally

insufficient.”); Helmka, 86 Wash.2d at 92, 542 P.2d 115 ( “Probable cause cannot be

made out by conclusory affidavits.”); state v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 61, 515 P.2d

496 (1973) (record must show objective criteria going beyond the personal beliefs and

suspicions of the application for the warrant).

The rule the state proposes would broaden “to an intolerable degree” the strict

requirement that probable cause to search a certain location must be based on a factual

nexus between the evidence sought and the place to be searched. State v. Olson, 73

Wn.App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110(1994). Such a rule would not only subvert fundamental

constitutional protections but would be inconsistent with the approach and reasoning of

the courts previous and precedent cases.

It is a fact in this case trooper Wilson didn't file or fill out the required affidavit, nor did

he claim he even signed it to establish any facts for any magistrate to reasonably rely

upon for a detached and independent evaluation . TP- Vol. II at 408.

This requirement is constitutionally prescribed because information that is not sufficiently

grounded in fact is inherently unreliable and frustrates the detached and independent

evaluation function of the magistrate.


TP- Vol. II at 408.

Cross examination by Mr. Hamalian of trooper Wilson:

Q: … Were you the one who wrote the search warrant ?

A: No, I was not.

Q: Okay. Did you have any participation in it ?

A: I reviewed it and that was about it.

Q: Other than the information that you gathered and the evidence that you took control of

at the scene and later entered into evidence and processed, did you do any other

investigation into this case ?

A: I looked on the internet to see if Dr. Orvald was a doctor in the state of Washington

and I did find a web site with his name and phone number on it. However, the phone

number that his practicing office in Yakima was different than the one that Mr. Barber

had provided me.

Keeping in mind appellant had a bona-fide relationship per Oregon statute with Dr.

Orvald in the state of Oregon for his Oregon medical marijuana card mandated by law, it

would only be normal to provide the easiest number to speak with Dr. Orvald himself

in 2007 vs. possibly a wrong Washington number from 2004.


This case is not the type of case in which falls under the criteria of which the state, the

trail court or the reviewing court relies upon, State v. Hyder, 244 P.3d 454(2011). Those

line of cases are mandated reporting by licensed learned professions of a client admitting

criminal conduct . The medical marijuana law is not based on admitting criminal conduct

but, carving out protected class of citizen(s), and drug use. Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa.

Medical clinics does not qualify as a licensed person nor corporation engaging in lawful

rendered services under RCW chapter 18.71 et.seq. The only person or even entity that

could reasonably fall under this criteria would be the lawful custodian of the 7/20/2004

medical record, Dr. Orvald' Yakima place of business of Cardiothoracic Surg., Inc., 7017

Scenic Drive Yakima, WA. 98908, i.e. his office . Therefore, the reliance on State v.

Hyder is misplaced.



VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, discretionary review is necessary . Wherefore, the reasonable

requested remedy is, the conviction be reversed and the case remanded to the Superior

Court Jurisdiction for :

1). A declaration Declaring James Barber Sr' 7/20/2004 valid documentation with no

required expiration date therefore qualifies for exemption under RCW 69.0.308(e)…

Is a lawful order of a practitioner, legalizing the possession of cannabis, issued in good faith

for a legitimate medical purpose by Dr Thomas Orvald pursuant to RCW chapter 69.51A.



2). A written Finding Mr. James E. Barber Sr. has a right to medical treatment with cannabis

without ANY government interference(s) or “impairments” , his conduct is not a criminal

offense under the Washington UCSA wherefore his cannabis shall be his rightful property

under Washington state law.

3). Remand with instructions to dismiss the case under court rule 8.3 governmental

misconduct with prejudice.

4). Writing an order declaring Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic is an illegal entity

engaging in the practice of medicine, thus all contracts purporting to be valid documentation

are repugnant to public policy thereby are null and void.

Respectfully submitted on October 23 ,2011

_________________
James E. Barber Sr.
In Propria Persona

________________________________________________________
Attachments go here:


________________________________________________________

Chapter 69.51a RCW: Medical cannabis(formerly medical marijuana) "Ignorance of the law is no excuse officer"

Legal Citations (Page 1) - ASA Forum " All MMJ states Case law"

 

DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES E. BARBER,
Defendant.
Case No.: 2008129

DISQUALIFICATION
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE

COMES NOW YOUR DEFENDANT, James E. Barber and submits the following information regarding Disqualification of Judge Brown and affidavit of prejudice based on defendant’s personal knowledge and belief.

I James E. Barber, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say that:
1.I am over eighteen (18) years of age, and am competent to testify to the mattes herein.

3.I am the defendant in the above-captioned cause number.

4.I believe that the defendant cannot have a fair and impartial hearing by reason of the interest or prejudice of the otherwise Honorable Thomas Copeland and Stephen Brown against the defendant.

5.Your defendant’s son previously filed an affidavit of prejudice against the Supreme Court of the State of Washington d.b.a. State of Washington Political Subdivision Grays Harbor County District Court Judge Stephen Brown for crimes involving conspiracy and violations of chapter 9A.82 RCW, citing a pattern of profiteering activity which victimized your defendant as well as his son.

6.The following summary of facts outlines what I believe to be the interest or prejudice of the aforementioned Judge’s against the defendant:

FACTS

I believe that the otherwise honorable Judge Thomas Copeland, while acting in cahoots with the otherwise Honorable Stephen Brown, has engaged in a conspiracy with law enforcement, to abandon his fiduciary duty to the sovereign citizens of the state of Washington; to wit, his duty to protect personal property rights, and to subsequently violate certain Washington statutes for financial gain. Furthermore, both Judge Copeland and Judge Brown have committed multiple acts or omissions in furtherance of that conspiracy, which unswervingly reveals the prejudicial and bias position occupied by both Thomas Copeland and Stephen Brown. I believe Judge Copeland and Judge Brown are continuing to engage in acts or omissions which are intended to defraud the federal government and the sovereign citizens of the state of Washington of honest services and property in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud.

Your defendant plans to file an action for relief from the deprivation of property and liberty without due process of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1985, and failure to prevent a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1986; pursuant to the belief that the defendant was injured as a result of a statewide conspiracy to deprive the defendant (and other sovereign citizens of the state of Washington similarly situated to the plaintiff with regard to the medical use of marijuana) of fundamental liberties by creating false reports, unlawfully exercising statutory seizure and forfeiture authority, and intentionally misinterpreting material facts to financially gain. The misrepresentations are commonly interposed to collect state and federal grant funds which would not otherwise be available.

Furthermore, both Thomas Copeland and Stephen Brown have spoken to your defendant within the court in an unfit manner. Both Justices fail to give the same basic respect as has been given to opposing counsel and parties in various cause numbers. Specifically, your defendant has not been allowed to participate in cases in which he is an interested party and has been threatened by such justices for attempting to redress either his grievances or the various frauds being perpetrated against him and his property. Specifically, while allowing Steve Johnson to have assistance at his defense table from William Lerass, a deputy county prosecutor, Judge Brown advised Your Defendant that he would be arrested for contempt if he assisted his disabled son, who was the Plaintiff in that case.

Finally, Judge Thomas Copeland has expressed personal opinions with regard to the Washington State Medical Marijuana Act and because of those statements I feel that he is so far handicapped by personal bias that he cannot effectively discharge the official duties of his elected position and I intend to relate a Quo Warranto for said misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance while in elected office. It is partially because of this intense personal prejudice toward Marijuana and the Medical Marijuana Act and that your defendant cannot have a fair and impartial hearing before the otherwise Honorable Thomas Copeland.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
"It is fundamental to our system of justice that judges be fair and unbiased." Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn.2d 802, 807, 557 P.2d 307 (1977).To that end, the appearance of fairness doctrine requires the absence of actual or apparent bias on the part of a judge or decision-maker. State v. Post, 118 Wn.2d 596, 618, 826 P.2d 172, modified, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); State v. Romano, 34 Wn. App. 567, 569, 662 P.2d 406 (1983); State v Madry, 8 Wn. App. 61, 70, 504 P.2d 1156 (1972). "The critical concern in determining whether a proceeding appears to be fair is how it would appear to a reasonably prudent and disinterested person. Brister v. Tacoma City Council, 27 Wn. App. 474, 486-87, 619 P.2d 982 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1006 (1981). These broad concepts are implemented in part by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Plaintiff Barber requests that Judge Copeland, pursuant to RULE(S) 8.9 (a) and RULE 8.9 (b), and Judge Brown, pursuant to RULE 8.9 (a), enter an order of disqualification and recuse themselves from any further proceedings in this case or any other matter involving your defendant.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
This 1st day of May, 2008.

X


JAMES E. BARBER

Signed and sworn to before me this 1st day of May, 2008.

_________________________________________
Printed name: ___________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of
Washington, residing at______, Washington
My commission expires: __________________ DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

State of Washington,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES E. BARBER,
Defendant.
Case No.: 2008129

MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
(CrRLJ 2.4)


COMES NOW YOUR DEFENDANT, James E. Barber, in propria persona, and hereby moves this honorable Court to order the State's Attorney to produce a Bill of Particulars to make more definite and certain the accusatory instrument of plaintiff pursuant to CrRLJ RULE 2.4. Mr. Barber requires a Bill of Particulars because in a number of respects, the April 22, 2008 information does not provide Mr. Barber with the information necessary to prepare his defense to wit: the venue in which the process of plaintiff was issued and served and the jurisdiction of this tribunal invoked over the accused by the accusatory instrument and process of the plaintiff.
In support of his Motion, Mr. Barber states or asks as follows:

1.The Defendant was charged with a V.U.S.C.A., Possession of Marijuana less than 40 grams, on the 22nd of April 2008.

2.The ACCUSATION fails to specify with peculiarity the following:

a.The particular acts alleged.

b.The time and circumstances of the alleged acts.

c.The allegation(s) or fact(s) that the plaintiff depends upon to establish the status of the accused within purview of the statute alleged by plaintiff to have been violated by the accused.

d.The allegation(s) or fact(s) the plaintiff depends upon to establish the accused is within the venue of the process purported to be properly served upon the accused?

e.The allegation(s) or fact(s) the plaintiff depends upon to establish the personal jurisdiction of the above captioned tribunal over accused and to establish that such personal jurisdiction was regularly and lawfully obtained?

3.Is RCW 69.50.4014, under authority of which plaintiff purports to bring statutory accusation against the accused, enacted by the Washington Legislative assembly under the authority of the Common-Law Jurisdiction, in a venue consistent therewith, as authorized by the Constitution for the State of Washington? Yes or No.

4.Is RCW 69.50.4014 under authority of which plaintiff purports to bring statutory accusation against the accused, enacted by the Washington Legislative assembly under the authority of the Corporate Jurisdiction, in a venue consistent therewith, as authorized by the Constitution for the State of Washington? Yes or No.

5.Is RCW 69.50.4014 under authority of which plaintiff purports to bring statutory accusation against the accused, enacted by the Washington Legislative assembly under the authority of the Maritime/Admiralty Jurisdiction, in a venue consistent therewith, as authorized by the Constitution for the State of Washington? Yes or No.

6.Is 69.50.4014 under authority of which plaintiff purports to bring statutory accusation against the accused, enacted by the Washington Legislative assembly under the authority of the Martial-Law Jurisdiction, in a venue consistent therewith, as authorized by the Constitution for the State of Washington? Yes or No.

7.Does plaintiff invoke a Common-Law Jurisdiction in the instant statutory cause in the above captioned tribunal? Yes or No.

8.Did plaintiff issue and serve process in a Common-Law venue to compel the appearance of the accused in the above captioned tribunal and cause consistent therewith? Yes or No.

9.Does plaintiff invoke a corporate Jurisdiction in the instant statutory cause in the above captioned tribunal? Yes or No.

10.Did plaintiff issue and serve process in a corporate venue to compel the appearance of the accused in the above captioned tribunal and cause consistent therewith? Yes or No.

11.Does plaintiff invoke a Maritime/Admiralty Jurisdiction in the instant statutory cause in the above captioned tribunal? Yes or No.

12.Did plaintiff issue and serve process in a Maritime/Admiralty venue to compel the appearance of the accused in the above captioned tribunal and cause consistent therewith? Yes or No.

13.Does plaintiff invoke a Martial-Law Jurisdiction in the instant statutory cause in the above captioned tribunal? Yes or No.

14.Did plaintiff issue and serve process in a Martial-Law venue to compel the appearance of the accused in the above captioned tribunal and cause consistent therewith? Yes or No.

15.Does plaintiff allege that the ''person,'' as defined in and for the statute(s) RCW 69.50.4014, violation of which said statute(s) is alleged by the accusatory instrument of plaintiff, an Artificial Person? Yes or No.

16.Does plaintiff allege that the ''person,'' as defined in and for the statute(s) RCW 69.50.4014 violation of which said statute(s) is alleged by the accusatory instrument of plaintiff, a Natural Person? Yes or No.

17.Does the statute (s) RCW 69.50.4014, violation of which said statute(s) is alleged by the accusatory instrument of plaintiff, conform to the Controlled Substances treaty between the federal government and the United Nations outlawing the hemp crop with the provision mandating that federal authorities control all drugs of abuse at least as strictly as required by the Single Convention(21 U.S.C. § 811(d))? YES or NO.

Failure of plaintiff to timely provide the accused the BILL OF PARTICULARS herein demanded by accused, to make more definite and certain the accusatory instrument and accusations of plaintiff in the aforesaid respects for clarification of the venue and Jurisdiction of the statute(s) depended upon by plaintiff and the venue and jurisdiction invoked by plaintiff in the above captioned tribunal, will be considered an attempt by plaintiff to withhold full disclosure of the nature and cause of the accusations brought by plaintiff and will make it impossible for the accused to meaningfully respond to or defend against the accusations and process made and issued or caused to be issued by plaintiff. The Defendant requires the above information to properly plead as well as prepare an adequate defense. This Court has the discretion to require the State to produce a Bill of Particulars.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court should order the filing of a Bill of Particulars to provide Mr. Barber with the specific information necessary to his defense as set forth above.

Respectfully submitted,

This 1ST, day of MAY, 2008. DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

State of Washington,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES E. BARBER,
Defendant.
Case No.: 2008129

DEMAND FOR DISCOVERY RULE CrRLJ 4.7

COMES NOW YOUR DEFENDANT, James E. Barber, and demands the following Discovery pursuant RULE CrRLJ 4.7;

(1)The names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses;

(2)Any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant, or made by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one;

(3)Any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons;

(4)Any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects which the prosecuting authority intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belonged to the defendant;

(5)Any record of prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting authority of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial;

(6)Any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of the defendant's premises or conversations to which the defendant was a party and any record thereof;

(7)Any expert witnesses whom the prosecuting authority will call at the hearing or trial, the subject of their testimony, and any reports relating to the subject of their testimony that they have submitted to the prosecuting authority;

(8)Any information indicating entrapment of the defendant;

(9)Specified searches and seizures;

(10)The acquisition of specified statements from the defendant; and

(11)The relationship, if any, of specified persons to the prosecuting authority.

Dated this 1ST, day of MAY, 2008.

 

This is the document the state produced in court showing Paul Stanford attempting to fry a patient.

He turned over my oregon medical records to the state of washington then signed a declaration I had a bellevue, wa. thcf recommendation when I never visited any thcf clinic for a wa. recommendation in 2006.

I did go too portland, oregon in 2006 and get my oregon documents from them though..

Paul Stanford tried to pull a quick one claiming I had a 2004 thcf bellevue, wa. recommendation when they wasn't even licensed in wa. in 2004.

 

THCF IS NOT LICENSED ANYMORE ..LMFAO. Big Grin at least as of today their not.. maybe under a different name now.. BUT THEY DON'T EXIST WITH PAUL STANFORD RUNNING IT AS SOLE SHAREHOLDER ANYMORE..

https://fortress.wa.gov/dol/dolprod/bpdLicenseQuery/lqsSearchResults.aspx
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