My Lost America - Part IV

~An open letter from Gen. Colin Powell to Senator John McCain~​

Dear Senator McCain,

I just returned to town and learned about the debate taking place in Congress to redefine Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. I do not support such a step and believe it would be inconsistent with the McCain amendment on torture which I supported last year.

I have read the powerful and eloquent letter sent to you by one my [sic] distinguished predecessors as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jack Vessey. I fully endorse in tone and tint his powerful argument. The world is beginning to doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism. To redefine Common Article 3 would add to those doubts. Furthermore, it would put our own troops at risk.

I am as familiar with The Armed Forces Officer as is Jack Vessey. It was written after all the horrors of World War II and General George C. Marshall, then Secretary of Defense, used it to tell the world and to remind our soldiers of our moral obligations with respect to those in our custody.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

~Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention~​

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) taking of hostages;

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

 

~An open letter from Gen. John W. Vessey Jr. to Senator John McCain~​

Dear Senator McCain:​

Sometimes, the news is a little garbled by the time it reaches the forests of <ST1North-Central Minnesota</ST1, but I call your attention to recent reports that the Congress is considering legislation which might relax the United States </ST1support for adherence to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. If this is true, it would seem to weaken the effect of the McCain amendment on torture of last year. If such legislation is being considered, I fear that it may weaken America </ST1in two respects. First, it would undermine the moral basis which has generally guided or conduct in war throughout our history. Second, it could give opponents a legal argument for the mistreatment of Americans being held prisoner in a time of war.<O</O​

<O</O
In 1950, three years after the creation of the Department of Defense, the then Secretary of Defense, General George C. Marshall, issued a small book, titled The Armed Services Officer. The book summarized the laws and traditions that governed our Armed Forces over the years. As the Senate deals with the issue it might consider a short quote from the last chapter of that book which General Marshall sent to every American officer. The last chapter is titled “Americans in Combat” and it lists 29 general propositions which govern the conduct of Americans in war. Number XXV, which I long ago underlined in my copy, reads as follows:

<O</O“The United States</ST1 abides by the laws of war. Its Armed Forces, in their dealing with all other peoples, are expected to comply with the laws of war, in the spirit and the letter. In waging war, we do not terrorize helpless non-combatants, if it is within our power to avoid so doing. Wanton killing, torture, cruelty or the working of unusual hardship on enemy prisoners or populations is not justified in any circumstance. Likewise, respect for the reign of law, as that term is understood in the United States</ST1, is expected to follow the flag wherever it goes….”

<O</OFor the long term interest of the United States </ST1as a nation and for the safety of our forces in battle, we should continue to maintain those principles. I continue to read and hear that we are facing a “different enemy” in the war on terror, no matter how true that may be, inhumanity and cruelty are not new to warfare nor to enemies we have faced in the past. In my short 46 years in the Armed Forces, Americans confronted the horrors of the prison camps of the Japanese in World War II, the North Koreans in 1950 – 53, and the Vietnamese in the long years of the Vietnam War, as well as knowledge of the Nazi's holocaust depredations in World War II. Through those years, we held to our own values. We should continue to do so.

<O</OThank you for your personal courage in maintaining those values, both in war and on the floor of the Senate. I hope that my information about weakening American support for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention is in error, and if not that the Senate will reject any such proposal.<O</O
<O</O
Very Respectfully,

<O</O[Signature]<O</O
<O</O

<O</O​

~The McCain Amendment~​

<O</OSEC. __. UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS UNDER THE DETENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

<O</O§ (a) IN GENERAL.--No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.<O</O

§ (b) APPLICABILITY.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to with respect to any person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense pursuant to a criminal law or immigration law of the United States</ST1.<O</O

§ (c) CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody or under the physical jurisdiction of the United States</ST1.<O</O


SEC. __. PROHIBITION ON CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.<O</O

§ (a) IN GENERAL.--No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.<O</O

§ (b) CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose any geographical limitation on the applicability of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under this section.<O</O

§ (c) LIMITATION OF SUPERSEDER.--The provisions of this section shall not be superseded, except by a provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act which specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions of this section.<O</O

§ (d) CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT DEFINED.--In this section, the term ''cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984.

 

Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” dated April 2006

Key Judgments: United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement-which includes al- Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells-is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.

• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.

• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida, could erode support for the jihadists. We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

• We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.

• The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings. We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

• The Iraq conflict has become the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight. We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims-all of which jihadists exploit. Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

• The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution-an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world-is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

• Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist
leaders. If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit. Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.

• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations. Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.

• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones. We judge that most jihadist groups-both well-known and newly formed-will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups. While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists. Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.

 

~An open letter from the Congressional Leadership to President George W. Bush~​

January 5, 2007​

President George W. Bush
The White House
Washington , DC 20500​

Dear Mr. President:​

The start of the new Congress brings us opportunities to work together on the critical issues confronting our country. No issue is more important than finding an end to the war in Iraq . December was the deadliest month of the war in over two years, pushing U.S. fatality figures over the 3,000 mark.​

The American people demonstrated in the November elections that they do not believe your current Iraq policy will lead to success and that we need a change in direction for the sake of our troops and the Iraqi people. We understand that you are completing your post-election consultations on Iraq and are preparing to make a major address on your Iraq strategy to the American people next week.​

Clearly this address presents you with another opportunity to make a long overdue course correction. Despite the fact that our troops have been pushed to the breaking point and, in many cases, have already served multiple tours in Iraq , news reports suggest that you believe the solution to the civil war in Iraq is to require additional sacrifices from our troops and are therefore prepared to proceed with a substantial U.S. troop increase.​

Surging forces is a strategy that you have already tried and that has already failed. Like many current and former military leaders, we believe that trying again would be a serious mistake. They, like us, believe there is no purely military solution in Iraq . There is only a political solution. Adding more combat troops will only endanger more Americans and stretch our military to the breaking point for no strategic gain. And it would undermine our efforts to get the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future. We are well past the point of more troops for Iraq.​

In a recent appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General John Abizaid, our top commander for Iraq and the region, said the following when asked about whether he thought more troops would contribute to our chances for success in Iraq :​

"I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq ? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon to us do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future."​

Rather than deploy additional forces to Iraq , we believe the way forward is to begin the phased redeployment of our forces in the next four to six months, while shifting the principal mission of our forces there from combat to training, logistics, force protection and counter-terror. A renewed diplomatic strategy, both within the region and beyond, is also required to help the Iraqis agree to a sustainable political settlement. In short, it is time to begin to move our forces out of Iraq and make the Iraqi political leadership aware that our commitment is not open ended, that we cannot resolve their sectarian problems, and that only they can find the political resolution required to stabilize Iraq.​

Our troops and the American people have already sacrificed a great deal for the future of Iraq . After nearly four years of combat, tens of thousands of U.S. casualties, and over $300 billion dollars, it is time to bring the war to a close. We, therefore, strongly encourage you to reject any plans that call for our getting our troops any deeper into Iraq . We want to do everything we can to help Iraq succeed in the future but, like many of our senior military leaders, we do not believe that adding more U.S. combat troops contributes to success.​

We appreciate you taking these views into consideration.​

Sincerely,​

Senate Majority Leader - Harry Reid​

House Speaker - Nancy Pelosi​

 

Thanks for your thoughts RM and yeah, I worry about whether the American President will listen to others outside of his circle of trust or forge ahead to disaster. This is a pivotal time in history because a fragile few might just get a chance to look at themselves if things get bad enough. What our decision means as a result also relates to the global "community," I guess simple put, it relates to us all so let's be wiser.

 

January 11, 2007
Press Release ​

Opening Statement in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Iraq: The Administration's Plan ​

United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Opening Statement in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearings on Iraq: The Administration's Plan
January 11, 2007
**Remarks as Prepared for Delivery** ​

Secretary Rice, welcome. ​

Nearly four years ago, Congress and the American people gave President Bush the authority to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and, if necessary, to depose its dictator. ​

We now know that the weapons of mass destruction were not there and the dictator is no longer there. The Iraqis have held elections. ​

But the country – and our troops -- are embroiled in a vicious civil war. As of last night, according to the Pentagon, 3009 Americans have lost their lives in Iraq. More than 22,000 have been wounded. We've spent hundreds of billions of dollars. And there is no end in sight. ​

For many months now, the American people have understood that our present policy is a failure – and they want to know where we go from here.
Last night, like millions of Americans, I listened to President Bush. ​

They hoped and prayed as I did that the President would present us with a plan to make things better in Iraq. Instead, I fear that what he has proposed will make things worse. ​

They hoped and prayed they would hear a plan that would start to bring our troops home while leaving a stable Iraq behind.
Instead, they heard a plan to escalate the war – not only in Iraq, but possibly into Iran and Syria as well. ​

The President's strategy is not a solution – it is a tragic mistake.
In Iraq, the core of the President's plan is to send another 20,000 Americans to Baghdad, a city of more than 6 million people, where they will go door-to-door in the middle of a civil war. ​

We have tried this kind of escalation twice before, in Baghdad. It failed. If we try it again, it will fail again. ​

The result will be the loss of more American lives and our military stretched to the breaking point, with little prospect for success. ​

This November, the American people voted for a dramatic change in course in Iraq.
The President said that he had heard them. But now it is clear that he did not listen.
And for the life of me, I do not understand how he could reject the overwhelming opposition to his plan from a broad, bi-partisan cross section of this country's leaders, military and civilian. ​

The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed his plan. Our commander in the region, General Abizaid, opposed the plan. Our commanders in Iraq, starting with General Casey, opposed the plan. The Baker-Hamilton Commission opposed the plan. And so did one of our greatest soldier-statesmen, Colin Powell. ​

The advice they gave the President can be boiled down to two things.
First, our military cannot stop Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds from killing each other. The Iraqis must make a political accommodation. The best way to concentrate the minds of Iraq's leaders and people on the hard compromises they must make for peace to be possible is to start drawing down our forces, not escalating them. ​

Second, the way to secure that political solution is to secure the support of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria – or, if a settlement fails to take hold, to help us contain the fall out within Iraq. So Secretary Rice, to be very blunt, I cannot in good conscience support the President's approach. ​

But because so much is at stake, I am also not prepared to give up on finding a bi-partisan way forward that meets the twin goals most Americans share: to bring home our troops while leaving behind a stable Iraq. ​

In all my years in the Senate, I don't think we have faced a more pivotal moment.
Failure in Iraq will not be confined to Iraq – it will do terrible damage to our ability to protect American interests all over the world, and for a long time to come. ​

That's why we have to continue to work together to find a solution – a solution that will gain the support of our citizens. For I learned a long time ago that no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. ​

I hope it is not too late. ​