U.S. Gov. Sheme and Artifice to deraud mmj community

Discussion in 'Marijuana Legalization' started by bsemaj, Feb 1, 2011.

  1. This will shock your conscious:eek:. Nice to finally get the truth of what the governments plans are for our mmj states in the U.S...:wave:

    1 word describes this document. DISINGENUOUS ! :devious:
     

    Attached Files:

  2. I don't see how any of this pertains to our current situation being that it's 15 years old....

    I'm not even sure what point you're actually trying to make here. Its not like there was anything shocking in there
     
  3. i feel as though this is outdated, but its scary how the government officials handle every aspect of controlling the U.S. citizens, isn't the government supposed to represent us? this has gone too far with the power, its kind of scary.
     
  4. sorry but whats a "sheme" ?
    :wave:
     
  5. he meant scheme i think
     

  6. I think he meant Defraud as well
    :hello:
     
  7. #7 bsemaj, Feb 1, 2011
    Last edited by a moderator: Feb 1, 2011
    looks like I missed the C in scheme..:eek: and the F in defraud.. ooops.

    It may be 15 yrs old..but, if you pay close attention of what the government is doing in the mmj community since this meeting took place. You find that the U.S. federal government is using the state offices of elected officials to thwart the peoples votes...

    Ummm, YES. DEFRAUD via contracts to our elected officials whom are paid under state taxes levied against the citizens to do the states business of the people. ;)

    Theft of Honest services of elected officials and state employees is a serious crime, both state and federal... not to mention the clear words they used in implementing the scheme to do so.:rolleyes:

    Conspiracy to deprive the rights of citizens of the mmj states is also a serious crime...:wave:

    Ever read the elements of a rico violation(s)? :eek: They are No joke... neither is the Hobbs act, wire/mail fraud, or federal funds to the states..:D
     
  8. Outdated?? At what point does a conspiracy end?? Answer, it doesn't with the policy making of this document... it is continuous. When was your drug task force in your county/city established ?? Before or after this meeting occurred??

    If before, did the language change in the contract after this meeting??

    If after, the entity was established specifically with 1 intent.. take the mmj community property and do it with our funds. Thereby we can make you federal agents on loan...by contracts to the states and give all liability/immunity coverage your not allowed by your oath given under state law....

    In otherwords, this allows any leo/lea to claim they are feds/dea when sued for wrong doing and all the records are work product of a federal investigation...

    Hence, they took over the state officer and their duty to the people of the state. Commandeered it.:eek:
     
  9. i told you the congressmen have been wiping their asses with our constitution
     

  10. The problem is this: Look at where the movement was in 1996, and look where it is now. Whatever they were conspiring to do back then (as you claim) hasn't worked.... this document was in reference to preventing California and AZ from developing a medical program. How many states have medical programs now?

    Show me a quote from that article that implicates anything illegal and/or signifies any sort of shady conspiring. I think you are looking too hard for a conspiracy that isn't there.
     
  11. #11 bsemaj, Feb 1, 2011
    Last edited by a moderator: Feb 1, 2011
    1) We need guidance from Fed govt. On liability issue. We want a memo from DEA protecting us when >>>we seize contraband on their behalf.<<< Seizure is pure statutory. State. State agents can not take property under a federal seizing law. The memo became an illegal contract. The contract allows the state officers to be commandeered...these contracts are still active to this day and used daily. The Kha case did not address these issues when ruling state agents can not enforce federal law...it was side stepped.

    Criminal Cases on a daily basis are being brought against we the people i.e. PATIENTS because of these meetings, which continue to this very day, only more wide spread... I guess you have to really understand the legal ramifications of this foundation.

    This document is just the beginning foundation of the proof....now stack the many meetings that have transpired since this one of the beginning, with the many different faces/names taking the money...:wave:

    Here is an example of a case of what I mean:


    The government must prove two elements to establish a violation of § 1341. The simpler of the two elements requires the defendant to have used the mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 54; Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723. The mailings themselves need not be essential to the defendant's scheme; rather, the mailings must have been made to execute the scheme. See United States v. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 103 L. Ed. 2d 734, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989); see also Silvano, 812 F.2d at 760 ("A mailing need only be closely related to the scheme and reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's actions."). There is no requirement that the defendant herself was responsible for the mailing that establishes the jurisdictional hook. See United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1237 (1st Cir. 1994).

    The second element of mail fraud requires the prosecution to establish that the defendant participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud with the specific intent 7 to defraud. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 54; Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723. "Scheme or artifice to defraud" is defined by § 1346 as "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346. In Woodward, drawing upon Sawyer, we articulated the following formulation of the elements of § 1346: "In Sawyer, we noted two of the ways that a public official can steal his honest services from his public employer: (1) the official can be influenced or otherwise improperly affected in the performance of his duties . . .; or (2) the official can fail to disclose a conflict of interest, resulting in personal gain." Woodward, 149 F.3d at 57 (citations omitted). 8 See also Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724 ("The cases in which a deprivation of an official's honest services is found typically involve either bribery of the official 9 or her failure to disclose a conflict of interest, resulting in personal gain."). We have recognized that this duty of disclosure arises not exclusively by statute, but also from the general fiduciary duty a public official owes to the public. In Woodward, we noted, "separate and apart from the state statute, 'the obligation to disclose material information inheres in the legislator's general fiduciary duty to the public.'" 149 F.3d at 62 (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 733 n.17). See also Silvano, 812 F.2d at 759 (stating, "the affirmative duty to disclose material information arises out of a government official's fiduciary relationship to his or her employer").

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    7 We recognize that "specific intent" is a legal term of art with a particularized meaning. In the context of § 1341, as we discuss infra, this term simply means that a public official must have acted with the intent to deprive the public of that official's honest services. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 729; see also Woodward, 149 F.3d at 55.

    8 We distinguish between a gift given with the intent to influence official action generally, required under § 1341, and a gift given for or because of an official act that has been performed or will be performed by a government officer, now required under § 201. Indeed, Sawyer has not alleged that Sun-Diamond, interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 201, should apply by analogy to honest services mail fraud under § 1341 to require that the government prove a link between the gratuity and an official act for or because of which it was given. While Sun-Diamond does not specifically mention § 1341, to read that opinion as affecting the well-settled interpretation of § 1341 would be inconsistent with its rationale. The Supreme Court partly based its decision in Sun-Diamond on a desire to read § 201, the gratuity statute, in a way that made sense given the "intricate web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts" by public officials. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 409. The Court noted specifically, "we ought not expand this one piece of the regulatory puzzle so dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits." 526 U.S. at 412.

    9 Although Sawyer initially describes this first element of § 1346 as involving proof of bribery, we recognized in Woodward that "the Sawyer case expanded category (1) from quid pro quo bribery, to include a more generalized pattern of gratuities to coax 'ongoing favorable official action.'" Woodward, 149 F.3d at 55 (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 730).

    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Because the practice of using hospitality to cultivate business relationships is "longstanding and pervasive," Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 741, it may become difficult to distinguish between lawful entertaining and acts that violate the honest services mail fraud statute. Intent is thus a crucial aspect of proof in any such prosecution, and "direct proof of fraudulent intent is often difficult to find." United States v. Rosen, 130 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). Having closely examined this issue of intent in Sawyer, we said in that opinion that the government must prove that the accused acted with two kinds of intent: that she intended to deprive the public of her honest services, and that she intended to deceive the public. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 729; see also Woodward, 149 F.3d at 55. While proof of the two kinds of intent might seem similar, these inquiries are distinct. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 729 n.12. "While it may be difficult to conceive of a scheme to deprive someone of the right to honest services without intending to deceive that person, the intent to deceive must nonetheless be established." Id. at 732 n.16. 10

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    10 We acknowledge that there seems to be some redundancy in the formulation of elements of honest services mail fraud. For example, in proving that an official intended to deceive the public, "[that] official's intentional violation of the duty to disclose provides the requisite 'deceit.'" Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 732. Thus, when the government seeks to prove a defendant's intent to deprive the public of an official's honest services by showing that she failed to disclose a conflict of interest, the evidence regarding that failure to disclose automatically satisfies the "intent to deceive" prong of § 1341. We recognized this point in Woodward. Having described the evidence that Woodward failed to disclose gifts from lobbyists, we then stated: "this same evidence also supports the finding that Woodward had the intent to deceive necessary for a mail and wire fraud conviction." Woodward, 149 F.3d at 63.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    For the government to establish the requisite intent to deprive the public of a legislator's honest services, the first of the two intent requirements for honest services mail fraud, the defendant must have intended to influence that legislator in her official action. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 729. The government may demonstrate this intent in many ways:

    For example, a bribery-like, corrupt intent to influence official action necessarily is an intent to deprive the public of an official's honest services. A person might not, however, give an unlawful gratuity with the intent to effect a specific quid pro quo. Rather, as the government contends here, a person with continuing and long-term interests before an official might engage in a pattern of repeated, intentional gratuity offenses in order to coax ongoing favorable official action in derogation of the public's right to impartial official services.
    Id. at 730. We reversed Sawyer's convictions for mail and wire fraud because we concluded that the jury instructions at his trial permitted the jury to convict him without finding that he intended to influence official action.
     

  12. I don't see how seizure is strictly a state issue, but even if it is I don't see how this memo constitutes mail fraud, if that's what you're implying. I think it's being blown out of proportion.
     
  13. #13 bsemaj, Feb 1, 2011
    Last edited by a moderator: Feb 1, 2011
    You obviously have never met up with a black masked military dressed down gun toting fool who just took all your belongings claiming they are DEA yet, show you a local leo badge...:wave:

    When you do...come back here and use this document to give your lawyer...he/she will know exactly what to do with it...to get your case dismissed and you a nice paycheck.:eek:

    Aside from that, use it as wallpaper.:confused:

    The mailings themselves need not be essential to the defendant's scheme; rather, the mailings must have been made to execute the scheme
     
  14. #14 bsemaj, Feb 4, 2011
    Last edited by a moderator: Feb 4, 2011
    Skilling v. United States (08-1394) | LII / Legal Information Institute

    Skilling v. United States (08-1394)

    Appealed from for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Jan. 6, 2009)
    Oral argument: March 1, 2010
    HONEST SERVICES FRAUD, SECURITIES FRAUD, JURY PREJUDICE, ENRON

    Former Enron Corporation executive Jeffrey K. Skilling was convicted by a federal jury in Houston, Texas of numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud and insider trading relating to Enron’s bankruptcy. After the Fifth Circuit upheld Skilling’s conviction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two key issues. First, the court will determine the scope and constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which makes it a crime for an employee of a corporation to fraudulently deprive the corporation of that employee’s “intangible honest services.” Second, the Court will determine whether and to what extent the government was required to prove—to the satisfaction of the parties and the district court—that no member of the Houston jury that convicted Skilling was actually prejudiced by the widespread negative media attention the Enron bankruptcy received in the Houston area before and during Skilling’s initial trial. The rulings on these issues may give much needed guidance to the lower courts in dealing with vague statutes, and may affect the scope of Sixth Amendment rights for every criminal defendant.
    • [Question(s) presented]
    • [Issue(s)]
    • [Facts]
    • [Discussion]
    • [Analysis]
    Questions Presented

    1. Whether the federal "honest services" fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, requires the government to prove that the defendant's conduct was intended to achieve "private gain" rather than to advance the employer's interests, and, if not, whether § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague.
    2. When a presumption of jury prejudice arises because of the widespread community impact of the defendant's alleged conduct and massive, inflammatory pretrial publicity, whether the government may rebut the presumption of prejudice, and, if so, whether the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror was actually prejudiced.
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    Issues

    Is the federal statute making it a crime for someone to “deprive another of the intangible right of honest services” unconstitutionally vague?
    When an entire community is outraged by the events giving rise to a criminal trial, is it possible to draw a jury that does not share the community’s presumed prejudice? If so, what standard should a court use to determine if the presumption of prejudice has been overcome?
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    Facts

    Jeffrey K. Skilling, former President, COO and CEO of the now-defunct Enron Corporation, was convicted by a federal jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading, all relating to his role in the highly-publicized failure of Enron. See U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2009). When Enron collapsed in late 2001, a president-appointed Task Force began an investigation and ultimately concluded that Skilling and other Enron leaders engaged in a conspiracy to overstate the value of the company in order to maintain artificially high stock prices. See id. The investigation culminated in criminal charges against Skilling and several other Enron executives; he received an enormous amount of unfavorable press, including in Houston, Texas. See id.
    Initially, fearing that he would be unable to receive a fair trial in Houston because of the impact of the Enron bankruptcy in the Houston area, Skilling attempted to relocate his trial to another district court. See Appendix, Brief of Respondent United States at 1a. However, reasoning that actual jury prejudice could be addressed during jury selection, the district court denied Skilling’s request. See id. at 19a. The trial proceeded in Houston. See 554 F.3d at 559.
    At trial, the government alleged that Skilling had committed honest services fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, among other charges. The government introduced evidence that Skilling improperly manipulated accounting rules to ensure that losses incurred by certain less-profitable divisions of Enron were placed on the books of more profitable divisions, thereby allowing failing divisions to appear profitable on paper. See 559 F.3d at 535. Despite being aware that certain units were failing, the Government argued, Skilling nonetheless made representations to investors and analysts that the divisions were prospering. See id. at 536. Additionally, the Government argued that Skilling and others conspired to create third-party shell companies in order to hide Enron’s troubled assets. See id. at 538.
    Throughout his trial, Skilling did not deny the charges against him, but rather insisted that none of his conduct was illegal because he had acted at all times in the company’s best interest. See id. at 542. Furthermore, Skilling asserted his allegedly false statements were taken out of context. See id.Finally, Skilling attacked the credibility of the Government’s witnesses. See id.The jury acquitted Skilling of insider trading charges, but ultimately convicted him of nineteen separate counts of conspiracy, fraud and making false statements; he was sentenced to 292 months in prison. See id.
    Skilling appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, alleging a variety of claims, two of which are relevant here. First, Skilling argued he did not commit honest services fraud because his fraud “was in the corporate interest and therefore was not self-dealing.” See id. at 545. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Skilling’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, concluding that the applicable elements of honest services fraud, (1) a breach of material state-law fiduciary duty, that (2) results in a detriment to the employer, were met in this case, and the jury’s verdict should stand. See id. at 547. Second, Skilling argued that the community’s “acrimony was so vitriolic” in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy that it was impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Houston. See id. at 557. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Skilling that prejudice should have been presumed. See id. at 561. However, after conducting a review of the extensive voir dire conducted by the district judge at trial, the Fifth Circuit concluded these procedures mitigated any prejudicial effect, and thus reversal on these grounds was unwarranted. See id. at 564–565.The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 13, 2009. See Docket No. 08-1394
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    Discussion

    There are two issues in this case: whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which criminalizes honest services fraud, is unconstitutionally vague, and what standard to use in determining that the presumption of jury prejudice has been overcome. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect businesses and give guidance to the lower courts on statutory interpretation; a ruling on the presumption of jury prejudice could also touch on every criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
    Honest Services Fraud

    The concept of honest services fraud developed in the common law and refers to the idea that a corporate officer or elected official owes a duty to the public to perform his or her job honestly. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Failure to do so defrauds the public of the “intangible” value of those services. See id. This view of honest services fraud as applied to the federal mail fraud statute was specifically repudiated in McNally, where the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1341 applied only to frauds involving “tangible” money or property. See483 U.S. at 351. In response, congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which specifically criminalizes “honest services fraud.”
    Since enacting § 1346, courts have struggled to develop a workable definition of the statute, which has resulted in a “kaleidoscope of inconsistent and inconclusive tests.” See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (“PCL”) at 11. In an apparent effort to resolve these inconsistencies, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in three different honest services fraud cases this term. See generally Skilling v. United States (No. 08-1394); Black v. United States (No. 08-876); Weyhrauch v. United States (No. 08-1196). Many commentators agree that § 1346 raises serious constitutional concerns and is likely unconstitutionally vague. See David G. Savage, The Supreme Court Critical of Honest Services Fraud, L.A.Times, Dec. 9, 2009; Gary S. Chafetz, The Fraud of Honest Services Fraud, Huffington Post, June 22, 2009.
    Without taking a position on the outcome of Skilling’s appeal, amici the Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. (“PCL”), argue that § 1346 should be held unconstitutional because of the dangers associated with vague statutes. See Brief of PCL at 15. PCL points out that generally speaking, vague statutes offend the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, because they fail to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. See Brief of PCL at 4. PCL contends that this leads to three basic problems: first, reasonable people may be unaware of what conduct a vague law actually prohibits; second, vague laws can be arbitrarily enforced because they do not provide prosecutors, judges or juries with specific guidance; third, they can interfere with basic freedoms by causing people to be over-cautious out of fear of violating the law. See id. at 5 (internal citation omitted). PCL contends that such statutes also raise significant concerns in a democracy: voters — whom elected officials must be accountable to — will not be able to understand, and therefore discipline, government officials’ conduct. See id. at 6-7.
    The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as amicus for Skilling, argues that the unconstitutional vagueness of § 1346 has implications for the business community as a whole. See Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12. According to the Chamber, because the prohibitions of § 1346 are so poorly defined, the statute deters legitimate business dealings because of the fear of prosecution. See id. Furthermore, because the statute can give rise to both civil and criminal racketeering liability under RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962), the Chamber argues that it unduly empowers plaintiffs’ attorneys and prosecutors to bring claims based on “nebulous but far-reaching theories of liability” and thus imposes substantial and “unwarranted” burdens on American business. Id. at 13–14.
    The United States responds to these claims by defending the overall constitutionality of § 1346. See Brief for Respondent United States at 37. Besides citing to court precedent, it also argues that Congress saw fit to protect “the intangible right of honest services,” which a ruling finding the statute unconstitutionally vague would harm. See id. at 38. The United States argues that limiting the interpretation of the statute would allow “core” honest services frauds to occur. See id. at 45.
    Jury Prejudice

    This cases also raises significant concerns about the risk of jury prejudice. As such, the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association have joined as amici arguing that empirical social science data contradict the Fifth Circuit’s claim that voir dire can effectively cure a presumption of a biased jury. See Brief of Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9. Furthermore, the Texas CDL amici argue that when there is substantial community pressure to reach a particular outcome in a case, as they assert there was here, studies suggest that jurors will reach that verdict regardless of their personal beliefs. See id. at 12. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers agrees, arguing that in this case especially, the community here “so strongly and uniformly viewed itself as the victim of the offenses to be tried.” Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18.
    The United States responds by arguing that any risk of presumed juror prejudice was irrelevant because of the District Court’s finding that the jury was, in fact, impartial. See Brief for Respondent United States at 18. Furthermore, the United States contends there was ample evidence introduced at trial to support Skilling’s conviction. See id. at 49.
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    Analysis

    There are two issues in this case that will require the lower court judgment against the petitioner to be vacated and the case to be remanded for further proceedings. First is the standard that should be used to determine whether a presumption of juror prejudice has been overcome; secondly is whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which criminalizes honest services fraud, is unconstitutionally vague.
    I. Presumption of Juror Prejudice

    Petitioner Jeffery K. Skilling (“Skilling”) contends that his conviction should be reversed because “inflammatory pretrial publicity and the nearly unprecedented community passion aroused by Enron’s collapse” created a substantial presumption of prejudice that denied him of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. See Brief for Petitioner Jeffery K. Skilling at 23–24. Skilling points to Supreme Court precedent that hold that voir dire alone is often insufficient to overcome a presumption of prejudice. See id. at 25. Skilling argues the Court has instead applied a categorical approach requiring change of venue or reversal per se whenever “the community passion or trial taint” is so severe as to give rise to a presumption of juror prejudice. See id. at 29. Skilling argues that voir dire alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption of juror prejudice. See id. at 29-30. He contends first that community pressure can be so strong at times that a juror can become “infused with biases they cannot recognize or will not disclose.” Id. Second, Skilling argues that even if jurors feel impartial at a trial’s outset, they can adopt a particular bias out of a “fear of ‘returning to his neighbors’ with anything other than a guilty verdict.” Id. at 31. Finally, Skilling asserts that when “inflammatory publicity” continues throughout a trial, an initially impartial juror can develop biases after the jury is empanelled. See id.Skilling buttresses these arguments with empirical studies supporting the conclusion that voir dire can be an insufficient tool to disclose deeply rooted prejudices. See id.
    Skilling argues that a per se transfer/dismissal rule, which should be used in such high profile cases as this one, would not be unduly costly to the judicial system. See Brief for Petitionerat 33. Unlike an exclusionary rule, he asserts, a per se transfer rule would not interfere with a court’s truth-seeking function, and because of the uniform nature of the federal courts in particular, it would not impose substantial difficulties on litigants. See id. at 34.
    Finally, Skilling argues that even if the Court refuses to adopt a per se rule requiring transfer or reversal upon a finding of presumed prejudice, it should nonetheless hold that the United States failed to overcome the presumption of juror prejudice in this case. See Brief for Petitioner at 34. According to Skilling, the proper standard for determining whether prejudice has been overcome is beyond a reasonable doubt, and here the United States fell far short of meeting that standard. See id. at 35. Because the district court failed to apply a presumption of prejudice initially, Skilling argues, it conducted the entire voir dire under an erroneous legal standard by failing to assume the juror’s statements were inherently unreliable. See id. at 37. Because of this error, Skilling concludes, his trial was constitutionally defective and reversal is required. See id. at 34.
    The United States responds to Skilling’s juror bias arguments by asserting that no Supreme Court holding requires an irrebuttable presumption of jury prejudice. See Brief for Respondent United States at 18. Further, the United States asserts that because the lower court determined that the jury that decided Skilling’s case was actually impartial, Skilling has suffered no constitutional injury. See id. at 19. According to the United States, all the Constitution requires is a panel of impartial jurors, not a venue where the populace has not been affected by the defendant’s crime or publicity about it. See id. Furthermore, the United States asserts that Supreme Court precedent establishes it is a defendant’s burden to show the impartiality of a jury “‘not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.’” See id. at 20 (internal citation omitted). Applying this standard, the United States argues Skilling has failed to demonstrate that his jury was actually biased. See id. at 21.
    The United States contends that Skilling’s proposed per se rule based on “pretrial publicity” is a mischaracterization of Supreme Court precedent. See Brief for Respondent at 25. According to the United States, the Court has only required such an extraordinary remedy once: where a small-town murder defendant’s jailhouse confession was repeatedly televised throughout the community. See id. This holding, the United States asserts, does not rise to a general rule. See id. at 26. In addition to characterizing Skilling’s proposed rule as contrary to precedent, the United States argues that a per se reversal rule would conflict with the Court’s “structural error” doctrine which broadly disfavors any automatic reversal without a showing of actual prejudice. See id. at 29. Imposing a per se rule, according to the United States, would create “serious obstacles to trial in prominent cases” especially when publicity is widespread. See id. at 31.
    Finally, the Untied States contends that even if the court adopts a rule presuming prejudice, the presumption should not apply here. See Brief for Respondent at 32. Skilling’s jury was drawn from a potential pool of 4.5 million people in the Houston metropolitan area, which the United States argues is sufficiently large to overcome any particular presumptions. See id. Second, the United States points to the fact that the district court judge presiding over Skilling’s trial was the third district court judge hearing an Enron-related case in the Houston area to independently conclude that it was possible to draw an impartial jury. See id. at 33. Third, by comparing the varied outcomes of the Enron-related cases tried in Houston, the United States contends that the various juries were able to correctly apply the law to the specific facts before them. See id. at 34. Ultimately, the United States argues that even if the Fifth Circuit was correct to conclude there was a presumption of prejudice, the record demonstrates that it was successfully rebutted in this case. See id. at 35.
    II. Constitutionality of Honest Services Fraud

    Skilling contends his conviction cannot stand because 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, as it fails to give “‘the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’” Brief for Petitioner at 38 (internal citations omitted). Though acknowledging that by enacting § 1346 Congress intended to overrule McNally v. United States,which held that a previous law only applied fraud to ‘tangible’ money,and codify the body of pre-McNally case law, Skilling contends that the body of law is so “hopelessly confusing” that it fails to provide sufficient “fair notice” as required by the Constitution. See id. at 39. The fundamental ambiguity of the statute, Skilling contends, is evidenced by the way the United States has applied it to prosecute “whatever defendant happens to be in the government’s sights.” Id. at 43. According to Skilling, by failing to proscribe specific conduct, § 1346 allows prosecutors impermissibly broad, essentially arbitrary discretion that runs afoul of the constitutional scheme. See id. at 44.
    Furthermore, Skilling asserts that applying common law tradition—i.e., lending meaning to § 1346 from pre-McNally cases dealing with honest services fraud—to cure a vague statute is contrary to precedent and “exceeds the judicial function.” See Brief for Petitioner at 45. According to Skilling, within our constitutional system, it is the role of Congress—and not the courts—to create specific laws that the courts can then apply. See id. at 46.
    Alternatively, Skilling argues that if § 1346 could be constructed in a way that passes constitutional muster, the Court should only apply it to scenarios where a defendant has received personal bribes and kickbacks. See BriefforPetitionerat 48. According to Skilling, this view is more consistent with pre­-McNally cases, and makes more sense in light of existing prohibitions on money and property fraud. See id. at 49. At a bare minimum, Skilling argues that for a conviction to stand under § 1346, a jury must be required to find that the defendant engaged in some sort of conduct resulting in private gain independent from his regular compensation. See id. at 53. Under any of these proposed formulations, Skilling contends, his conviction must be reversed. See id. at 57.
    The United States counters that § 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague because the pre-McNally definition of honest services fraud was well-established amongst the courts of appeals. See Brief for Respondent at 37. According to the United States, when Congress enacted § 1346, it simply intended to reinstate the long line of cases which had criminalized fraudulent deprivation of “honest services” in addition to fraudulent deprivation of money and property. See id. at 38. “Honest services,” the United States contends, is a term of art that is clearly defined in case law, and is well understood by courts and prosecutors alike. Id. at 39. Following McNally, the United States contends honest services wire fraud has three distinct elements: “(1) a breach of the duty of loyalty, undertaken with (2) an intent to deceive, that also is (3) material.” Id. Because honest services fraud requires “an intent to deceive,” the United States argues that the statute adequately protects defendants who honestly believe they have no conflict or disclosure duty. See id. at 41.
    Applying these three elements, the United States concludes § 1346 covers any situation where a defendant receives bribes or kickbacks or fails to disclose a financial conflict of interest when engaging in an official action. See Brief for Respondent at 42. Under this formulation, the United States argues Skilling’s contention that § 1346 is redundant in light of existing prohibitions of money and property fraud is refuted by pre-McNally case law, where there were clearly situations involving no actual deprivation of money and property that fell within the reach of the wire fraud statute. See id. at 45. Furthermore, the United States contends that Skilling “significantly overstates” the degree to which lower courts were in disagreement about the scope of the honest services doctrine pre-McNally. See id. at 46. According to the United States, the fact that prosecutors have sought over time to adopt varying theories of honest services fraud does not indicate the statute is vague, but instead shows that this follows lower courts resolving issues of statutory construction, to which the government may eventually respond. See id. at 49.
    Finally, the United States submits that even if the Court were to find § 1346 unconstitutionally vague, any error is harmless, because the evidence at trial provided ample support for Skilling’s conviction solely on the basis that he committed securities fraud. See Brief for Respondentat 52.
    top
    Conclusion

    Ultimately, this case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to answer two distinct and important constitutional questions touching on the constitutionality of § 1346 and the right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.
    Authors

    Prepared by: Tom Kurland
    Edited by: Lara Haddad
    Additional Sources

    · LII Wex: Law about White-Collar Crime






    :D:hello::hello::hello::hello::hello::hello:


    In addition to upholding honest-services prosecutions, courts also increasingly approved use of the mail-fraud statute to attack corruption that deprived victims of other kinds of intangible rights, including election fraud and privacy violations. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 18, n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362-364, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292, and nn. 1-4 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).


    The existence of a fiduciary relationship, under any definition of that term, was usually beyond dispute; examples include public official-public, see, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (C.A.4 1979); employee-employer, see, e.g., United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (C.A.9 1980); and union official-union members, see, e.g., United States v. Price, 788 F.2d 234 (C.A.4 1986). See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980) (noting the "established doctrine that [a fiduciary] duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties").


    Overlap with other federal statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. The principal federal bribery statute, § 201, for example, generally applies only to federal public officials, so § 1346's application to state and local corruption and to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that might otherwise go unpunished.




    We are cognizant of the problem of the ever expanding use of the mail fraud statute to reach activities that heretofore were considered within the exclusive domain of State regulation. See United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion). See also United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1252 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 891, 93 S.Ct. 118, 34 L.Ed.2d 148. Additionally, we note that statutes such as the mail fraud statute should be carefully and strictly construed in order to avoid extension beyond the limits intended by Congress. See United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346, 347 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 952, 90 S.Ct. 977, 25 L.Ed.2d 134 (1970). Nevertheless, we think the indictment and prosecution in this case constitute neither an unwarranted overextension of the mail fraud statute, as that phrase is used by Appellants, nor an impermissible federal intrusion into the political 1358*1358 affairs of the State of Maryland, but as will be later noted we do not adopt the broad reading of the statute sought by the United States.

    As just stated, we think the claim that prosecution under § 1341 constitutes an impermissible federal intrusion into the political affairs of the State of Maryland and thus violates principles of federalism is without merit. The purpose of the mail fraud statute and the corresponding limits upon its appropriate use, in the context of federalism problems, is clear. The purpose of § 1341 and its predecessors is to prevent the post office department from being used to carry out fraudulent schemes. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314, 16 S.Ct. 508, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1895) (interpreting a predecessor to § 1341). See also:

    United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974) (purpose of § 1341 is to prevent the misuse of the Postal Service). The constitutionality of the mail fraud statute and the limits upon its use to effectuate its purpose were stated by the Supreme Court in the following terms:

    "The overt act of putting a letter into the post office of the United States is a matter that Congress may regulate. [citation omitted] Whatever the limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."

    Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 368, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (interpreting a predecessor statute to § 1341). See also Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960).


    The basic purpose and scope of the mail fraud statute has been examined by numerous circuit courts as well. This court, in United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1975), echoed the words of the Supreme Court in Durland by stating, "[the mail fraud statute] prevents the post office from being used as an instrument of crime." Id. at 498. We also followed Badders by stating that "[t]he statute does not define a scheme to defraud, and it contains no restrictive language excluding any type of fraudulent conduct in which use of the mails plays an essential rule. On the contrary, the plain language of the statute condemns any scheme to defraud in which the mails are employed . . .." [citation omitted] Id. at 494-95. The Second Circuit has likewise recognized that the mail fraud statute's purpose and scope revolve around the misuse of the mails in Gouled v. United States, 273 F. 506, 508 (2d Cir. 1921), aff'd, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), and the Eighth Circuit has stated the purpose and scope of the mail fraud statute in almost the same language as that used by the Second Circuit in Gouled. See United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Lynn, 461 F.2d 759, 763 (10th Cir. 1972), described the reach of the mail fraud statute in the following terms: "The federal mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all frauds, but only those instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraudulent scheme. All other cases are to be dealt with by appropriate state law." (footnote omitted).


    From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the regulation of the mail fraud statute is on the misuse of the mails, control of which lies with Congress, and not on the substance of the scheme to defraud. Even if the substance of the scheme to defraud involves matters normally within the purview of state control or regulation, once the mails are utilized to effectuate the scheme, the federal government has the right to prosecute the schemer under the mail fraud statute.




    Congress first enacted the federal mail fraud statute in 1872,[8] and, although it has since been amended five times, the essential elements of an offense under the statute have remained unchanged.[9] See Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 Ill.L.F. 237, 239. Even though the mail fraud statute has been in existence for over 100 years, Congress has never defined or established the precise limits of the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud." See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976). Perhaps it is because, as one court has aptly pointed out, "The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity." Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 314 U.S. 687, 62 S.Ct. 309, 86 L.Ed. 550. Nevertheless, since Congress has not attempted to define the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud," the burden to do so has fallen on the courts. In order to determine the appropriate reach of the mail fraud statute, it has been necessary for the courts to attempt to define and establish the limits of the words "scheme or artifice to defraud" as they are used in the mail fraud statute. See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976).


    In attempting to define and establish the meaning of the words, scheme to defraud, the starting point for most courts has been to discern the purpose of the mail fraud statute. As previously stated, the purpose of the statute is to prohibit the misuse of the mails. See, e. g., Durland v. United States, supra; United States v. States, supra. With this purpose in mind, numerous courts have made general statements concerning the approach courts should take in attempting to define and establish the limits of the words "scheme or artifice to defraud." For example, the Eighth Circuit has stated, "[T]he definition of fraud in § 1341 is to be broadly and liberally construed to further the purpose of the statute; namely, to prohibit the misuse of the mails to further fraudulent enterprises." United States v. States, 488 F.2d at 764. See also United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. den., 309 U.S. 669, 60 S.Ct. 613, 84 L.Ed. 1016.


    For the most part, courts have broadly construed the words, "scheme or artifice to defraud." The result has been to include within that term many schemes involving deception which employ the mails in their execution if they are contrary to public policy and fail to measure up to accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play. In Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 368, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916), the Court stated, "Whatever the limits to [Congress'] power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy . . .." See also Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960). This public policy reference has been followed by some courts as setting the outer limits to the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" as that term is used in the mail fraud statute, i. e., any scheme contrary to public policy that involves deception can be prosecuted under the mail fraud statute if the mails are used in the execution of the scheme. See, e. g., United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 891, 93 S.Ct. 1361*1361 118, 34 L.Ed.2d 148. Other cases have used accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play as setting the outer limits to the term "scheme to defraud." In Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958), the court stated, "The aspect of the scheme to `defraud' is measured by nontechnical standard. It is a reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of society." To the same effect is Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). The Blachly court concluded by stating that this was indeed a broad definition of scheme to defraud. 380 F.2d at 671.


    Early in the history of the mail fraud statute, attempts were made to severely limit the term, scheme to defraud. In Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14, 16 S.Ct. 508, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1895), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" as used in the mail fraud statute was limited to common law concepts of fraud and false pretenses. See also United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247 (8th Cir. 1976). And the several courts that have been called upon to decide the question are uniformly of opinion that the fact that a scheme to defraud may or may not violate state law does not determine whether the scheme is within the proscription of the mail fraud statute. See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247, n. 2 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 891, 93 S.Ct. 118, 34 L.Ed.2d 148. As a result of the failure to limit the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" to common law definitions of fraud and false pretenses and schemes prohibited by State law, the mail fraud statute generally has been available to prosecute a scheme involving deception that employs the mails in its execution that is contrary to public policy and conflicts with accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing.
    C
    Without enumerating the various types of schemes that have been held cognizable under the mail fraud statute, it suffices to say that schemes involving bribery and some schemes of non-disclosure and concealment of material information come within the purview of the mail fraud statute.[10] See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 977, 96 S.Ct. 1484, 47 L.Ed.2d 748 (1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976); United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1362*1362 1974), cert. den., 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146; United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976). At this late date, there can be no real contention that many schemes to defraud a state and its citizens of intangible rights, e. g., honest and faithful government, may not fall within the purview of the mail fraud statute. See United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). Rather, the difficulty is whether the alleged scheme satisfies the fraud element of the mail fraud statute. Cf. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversal of a conviction under the mail fraud statute because an effort to avoid disclosure, although a breach of statutory obligation, was "hardly `a scheme or artifice to defraud'").


    As to whether a scheme involving the bribery of a public official satisfies the fraud element of the mail fraud statute, the question has long since been answered in the affirmative. Although most mail fraud prosecutions of public officials that allege bribery also allege that a state bribery law or law prohibiting the taking of additional fees has been violated, see, e. g., United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1104, n. 12 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 44 L.Ed.2d 450 (1975), such an allegation is not necessary to bring the alleged scheme within the purview of the mail fraud statute, for, as the court stated in Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 1085, 85 L.Ed. 1531,


    "A scheme to get a public contract on more favorable terms than would likely be got otherwise by bribing a public official would not only be a plan to commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a scheme to defraud the public. . . . No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud."

    The Shushan rationale has recently been restated by the Eighth Circuit in somewhat different language:

    ". . . t has been held in recent years that a public official may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 if he devises a scheme whereby bribes or kickbacks are accepted in the course of conduct of his office, since such conduct operates to defraud the citizens of his government of their right to his honest and faithful services. [citations omitted]."

    United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976).
    It is clear from Shushan and its many following cases that the fraud involved in the bribery of a public official lies in the fact that the public official is not exercising his independent judgment in passing on official matters. See, e. g., United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (2d Cir. 1976) (bribery of public official constitutes fraud since the public official has been paid to act in breach of his duties). A fraud is perpetrated upon the public to whom the official owes fiduciary duties, e. g., honest, faithful and disinterested service. When a public official has been bribed, he breaches his duty of honest, faithful and disinterested service. While outwardly purporting to be exercising independent judgment in passing on official matters, the official has been paid for his decisions, perhaps without even considering the merits of the matter. Thus, the public is not receiving what it expects and is entitled to, the public official's honest and faithful service.

    There are also cases concerning bribery schemes which support the view that money or tangible property need not be involved in the scheme to defraud in order for the mail fraud statute to be invoked. Beginning with Shushan v. United States, supra, the Fifth Circuit has included within the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" an operation to bribe and corrupt public officials in order to gain advantages and special treatment. See also Steiner v. United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774, 63 S.Ct. 1439, 87 L.Ed. 1721 (1943); Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683, 63 S.Ct. 205, 87 L.Ed. 547 (1942). In Shushan there is the implication that a scheme to gain personal favors from public officials is a scheme to defraud the public, although the interest lost by the public can be described no more concretely than as an intangible right to the proper and honest administration of government. "[T]here must be a purpose to do wrong which is inconsistent with moral uprightness." See 117 F.2d at 15. This concept, that a scheme to defraud of certain intangible rights is grounds for prosecution under § 1341 if the mails are used, is more explicitly stated in United States v. Faser, 303 F.Supp. 380 (E.D. La.1969). In Faser, the defendants were indicted under the mail fraud statue after they accepted bribes to deposit public funds in a certain bank. There, as here, the defendants contended the indictment failed to state an offense because it did not allege that someone was actually defrauded out of something tangible that can be measured in terms of money or property. In rejecting that argument the court specifically discussed whether a fraudulent scheme must entail money or property in order for there to be an offense under § 1341. As an alternative ground for overruling the motion to dismiss, the court stated:

    t is further the opinion of this Court that the thing out of which it is charged that the State was defrauded need not necessarily be that which can be measured in terms of money or property. It is the opinion of this Court that it is a violation of the statute in question if a person defrauds the State out of the "loyal and faithful services of an employee." * * *

    Thus it seems quite clear that even if the thing out of which the State was allegedly defrauded was not susceptible of measurement in terms of money or physical property, a valid indictment may still result therefrom.

    303 F.Supp. at 384-385.

    See also United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D.Mass.1942). In each of these cases, the court upheld the mail fraud indictment on the ground that the mails had been used in a scheme to defraud a corporation of the "honest and faithful services" of one or more employees. In addition, cf. Alexander v. United States, 95 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1938) (defendants convicted for using mails in scheme "to defraud the public" by issuing false medical diplomas and licenses to persons without medical education). These cases serve as persuasive authority for the proposition that in a prosecution for use of the mails to further and execute a vote fraud scheme the indictment states an offense even though it does not contain allegations that anyone was defrauded of any property or money.
     
  15. Some have said that the memo is OLD and not even worth addressing.. These EXHIBITS show that despite some OPINIONS here, The below EXHIBITS clearly show that the memo is not isolated to 2 STATES but, ALL THE STATE IN AMERICA. Because of the DEA hook into diversion of DRUGS in general and TRAFFICKING... marijuana is a SCHEDULE 1 DRUG IN DIRECT PURVIEW OF THE DEA.

    Exhibit 4-LIABILITY DISCLAIMER PER MEMO-NCIS is a Federal MILITARY investigative Agency-d. Drug Task Force means DEA-

    Exhibit-5- #18 and #19 is specific to follow all laws. Even Tax Defrauding.

    Exhibit 6- Pg. 11 (TNET/DEA)-legal advisor to the sheriff and the local county prosecutor is his other state tax paid job.

    Exibit 7- Retired Tax theft EXPERT of WESTNET. #1 State tax defrauder in Wa. Law Enforcement for the DEA.

    Exhibit 8


    The next post will show how the locals using the DEA liability DISCLAIMER clause ARE collecting state tax dollars to operate under federal duties...
     

    Attached Files:

  16. [​IMG] FEDERAL GRANT-Critical ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL TASK FORCES.pdf (87.2 KB)




    [​IMG] FEDERAL GRANT-GHDTF-rick scott.pdf (96.0 KB)



    [​IMG] FEDERAL GRANT-JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT APPLICATION.pdf (546.3 KB)



    [​IMG] satterberg.pdf (257.3 KB)

    The State Prosecuting Authority of the State in King County Wa. has noted that the VOTER' of wa. legalized medical marijuana for their use of specific SUFFERING conditions.
    :hello::smoke:

    [​IMG] Wa. board of pharmacy does not regulate herbal substances..pdf (60.5 KB)




    The Wa. State AAG makes the distinction of what a controlled substance is and is not. She clearly states the facts.. cannabis is an HERB, not a dangeruos DRUG.:eek:

    :wave:

    REFUND OUR STATE TAX MONEY AND HELP BALANCE OUR BUDGET YOU THEIVES.:devious:
     

    Attached Files:

  17. Im happy to see this, actually. Look at all these plans they had to defeat mmj and THEY FAILED!!!!!!!:D


    I still don't get this conflicting with federal law thing that people always say, because while it sure looks like it conflicts with federal law, technically it does not. The reason for this is that there is nothing in the federal law that requires states to have certain laws on the books. Nothing in the federal law says " all 50 states shall (trying to use the terms used in law writing here) have laws prohibiting the use of marijuana for any reason." Yes, its illegal at the federal level for any reason, but nothing requires any state to have any law on their own state level requiring this. Basically state laws allowing medical (or in the future hopefully any) usage of marijuana with it illegal at the federal level just means the state is technically saying "were not going to do anything about marijuana, feds, its up to you."

    The only way it would truly conflict with federal law is if they passed a law that prohibting DEA agents or any federal agency from undertaking anti marijuana action within their state (not that i would mind such a thing at all).
     
  18. very interesting read I sad to know how they really feel
     



  19. You missed the mark here my friend... they did succede in their plans.... they added the liability disclaimer allowing these TYPE of persons to seize our property using local LEO to claim federal agent status under the DEA...

    So I think you mis-read the above under the guise of cannabis "USE" has spread to more than 2 states and they lost the fight !!

    When you really look at what the above is about... you find it is all about stealing someone's property under the federal schedule 1 regime... which the medical states pay taxes to state employees to conduct state business, not federal.

    We have state tax based paid employees hiding under a federal liability disclaimer clause...

    Do you O.K. this type of tax fraud ? does congress? does the I.R.S.? Do the courts?

    DO ANY OF THE STATE MMJ LAWS ALLOW THIS? NO THEY DO NOT !!! DO ANY STATE OR FEDERAL TAX LAWS ALLOW THIS? TAX FRAUD UNDER CONTRACTS ARE NOT LEGAL.
     
  20. They were hoping to force the laws to be struck down or hoping they could stop doctors from writiting reccommendations by revoking licenses. I think their failure to do so is an important victory on our part.
     

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