If Mind is different than Brain, how would you describe it?

Discussion in 'Philosophy' started by AspiringDirtbag, Nov 15, 2014.

  1. #21 Dvaita, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 17, 2014
     
    My friend, you seemed to have missed my point all together... in other words, there's a stark difference between passive activity, the initiation of activity, and the consciousness/idea of activity (physicality may be a pre-requisite for the first kind of activity, while the mind is a pre-requisite for the two latter kind). Re-read that Descartes quote in post #10 -try to understand and it- and then you ought get the gist of what it is I'm saying.

     
  2. #22 Account_Banned283, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited: Nov 17, 2014
     
    No.. you're indirectly asserting that the mind has primacy over the brain, whereas my point was that it's a mere activity of the brain, and is therefore subordinate to the brain, if anybodies ''missed the point'', it's you. :huh:
     
  3. #23 Dvaita, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 17, 2014
     
    Yea, in my opinion, our present back-and-forth is not so much about a disagreement pertaining immediately to the metaphysics of mind and body, in as much as I believe that this back-and-forth of ours revolves around the semantics (or hermeneutics) of what it means to "walk" ('walk' - which is just a word used by humans in order to refer to the idea of a perceived activity, like all words are ultimately referential); in other words, I don't believe that the term 'walking', as the term is contextualized according to conscious humans beings, simply denotes the loco-motion of an extended body, but rather, as I've stated over and over, the arbitrary initiation of action and, the feeling/consciousness of it (and as I conveyed to you in post #10, a pair of physical legs cannot initiate their own activity, i.e., the predicate of 'walking' cannot truly be ascribed to a physical subject, or passive limb, but only to an active agent, and neither does the possession of a pair of physical legs necessarily entail any feeling represented within them, i.e., physical legs, per se, are not a pre-requisite for the perception of walking).
     
    But if all of this is not making sense to you, then let me express a point which may help to shed some light onto our discussion: in regards to the existence of actual 'things' (no matter if there taken to be "physical" or "mental"), I adhere to the bundle theory; meaning, to me, an empirical (and not a presumed or intellectually presupposed "physical" or "mental") pair of legs -as we are directly competent of them in sensible knowledge- are nothing but a bundle of perceptions, thus, to me, as a person who adheres to bundle theory, a "pair of legs" are naught but an intuitive collection of various perceptions; consequentially, an empirical pair of legs -the only kind of legs there are- cannot be a pre-requisite for my 'walking', and for the simple fact that my 'walking' ([SIZE=14.3999996185303px]as the term is contextualized according to conscious humans beings) [/SIZE]does not entail me actuating or directly acting upon the empirical perceptions, of a "pair of legs", themselves, i.e., the pair of legs which are seen, touched, smelt, etc., (i.e., the only kind of legs there are - according to bundle theory).
     
  4. #24 Account_Banned283, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited: Nov 17, 2014
     
     
    I don't believe that the term 'walking', as the term is contextualized according to conscious humans beings, simply denotes the loco-motion of an extended body, but rather, as I've stated over and over, the arbitrary initiation of action and, the feeling/consciousness of it (and as I conveyed to you in post #10, a pair of physical legs cannot initiate their own activity, i.e., the predicate of 'walking' cannot truly be ascribed to a physical subject, or passive limb, but only to an active agent, and neither does the possession of a pair of physical legs necessarily entail any feeling represented within them, i.e., physical legs, per se, are not a pre-requisite for the perception of walking).
     
    Honestly, I don't even understand why you think this is relevant, my analogy between ''legs'' and ''walking'' was meant to show as an example of the relationship between ''brain'' and ''mind'', one is an ''activity'', the other is/are a mechanism/s required for that ''activity''. If what you're trying to do is conflate ''legs'' with a ''brain'', then it obviously won't support what you're saying, because they are vastly different ''mechanisms'', and, if anything, it's actually more supportive of my argument to conflate the two, because just as legs can be physically stimulated in such a way as to create a particular and predictable effect (movement/physical activity), so to can the brain be physically stimulated in such a way as to create a particular and predictable effect (mental activity). It seems to me that what you're saying rests entirely on the proposition that there is an ''invisible man'' or ''active agent'' within you, and this is something that my first point (the mind being an activity of the brain), if true, would seemingly refute.
     
    But if all of this is not making sense to you, then let me express a point which may help to shed some light onto our discussion: in regards to the existence of actual 'things' (no matter if there taken to be "physical" or "mental"), I adhere to the bundle theory; meaning, to me, an empirical (and not a presumed or intellectually presupposed "physical" or "mental") pair of legs -as we are directly competent of them in sensible knowledge- are nothing but a bundle of perceptions, thus, to me, as a person who adheres to bundle theory, a "pair of legs" are naught but an intuitive collection of various perceptions; consequentially, an empirical pair of legs -the only kind of legs there are- cannot be a pre-requisite for my 'walking', and for the simple fact that my 'walking' ([SIZE=14.3999996185303px]as the term is contextualized according to conscious humans beings) [/SIZE]does not entail me actuating or directly acting upon the empirical perceptions, of a "pair of legs", themselves, i.e., the pair of legs which are seen, touched, smelt, etc., (i.e., the only kind of legs there are - according to bundle theory).
     
    Since there is absolutely no discernible reason to think that ''things'' are merely a ''bundle of perceptions'', and not actually ''physical objects'', I do not see how you could form any plausible argument from your position.

     
  5. #25 SlowMo, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 17, 2014
    Cool post  :smoking:
     
    Not sure how "the mind" (as in conscious mind) has the last say when it doesn't get the word on the results of even its own request for a "conscious" decision until some discreet interval of time after it's already been distilled from the zillions of interlinked conditional neural firing states that took place to arrive at the choice. It even appears from many experiments that the production of our conscious experience is one of the last processes to be handled, while the filtering and testing of info that may or may not be required for fast reaction to threat takes precedent. Hell, we can even drive a car on a busy interstate highway with little conscious deliberation and a sometimes scary dimness in awareness. We say, "we're on autopilot". In reality, we're always on autopilot to a certain degree, for this vehicle "does it all" - including projecting an imaginary driver - aka "me". :laughing:  
     
  6. #26 Dvaita, Nov 17, 2014
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 17, 2014
     
    Are you really suggesting that all human action is conditioned, and pre-determined, by mechanical processes? Meaning, are you really suggesting that all human action is inexorably pre-determined, and so, cannot be altered by any person whatsoever?
     
    Let me ask the question in another way: do you actually believe, and accept the idea, that the Columbine shooters were necessitated to carry out the action that they did because their brains forced them to (or that they were on "auto-pilot" while their brains forced them to)? Thus, "they" are not at fault, because "they" are merely an imaginary projection (i.e., unreal) - really? Boy, if the most modern, and advanced, form of academia, i.e., the academia of the West, leads people to sponsor (maybe you were pre-determined to?) such answers and beliefs, then it's no wonder the world is the way it is.
     
    \nHonestly, I don't even understand why you think this is relevant, my analogy between ''legs'' and ''walking'' was meant to show as an example of the relationship between ''brain'' and ''mind'', one is an ''activity'', the other is/are a mechanism/s required for that ''activity''. If what you're trying to do is conflate ''legs'' with a ''brain'', then it obviously<span style="background-color:rgb(247,247,247);"> won't support what you're saying, because they are vastly different ''mechanisms'', and, if anything, it's actually more supportive of my argument to conflate the two, because just as legs can be physically stimulated in such a way as to create a particular and predictable effect (movement/physical activity), so to can the brain be physically stimulated in such a way as to create a particular and predictable effect (mental activity). It seems to me that what you're saying rests entirely on the proposition that there is an ''invisible man'' or ''active agent'' within you, and this is something that my first point (the mind being an activity of the brain), if true, would seemingly refute.</span>
    \nBoy, you sure seemed to have missed the entire point of my last few posts' (there's a reason that, in my first post addressed to you in this thread, I differentiated between 1) loco-motion, 2) the initiation of activity, and 3) the idea of activity). But hey, that's your prerogative.
    \nSince there is absolutely no discernible reason to think that ''things'' are merely a ''bundle of perceptions'', and not actually ''physical objects'', I do not see how you could form any plausible argument from your position.
    \nLol, no discernible reason? Okay, if this really is so, as you claim, Mr. smart guy, answer me this: can you describe to me an object's (let alone a "physical" one's) being without referencing attributes rooted in, and discerned by, sensory-experience (i.e., sensations)? I'll wait.....
    </div>
     
  7. What's a person? Isn't a person a physical thing? How could a physical thing do anything?
     
  8. Looks like he just walked the plank.
     
  9. Saying 'Mind' and 'Brain' is like saying 'Body' and 'Soul.'
     
    One is tangible, the other is metaphysical yet they
     
    coexist as a singular being.. one we can observe, the other
     
    we can only hope to.
     
  10. #30 Account_Banned283, Nov 18, 2014
    Last edited: Nov 18, 2014
     
    Seeing as how you'll probably make another account, I may as well;
     
    Boy, you sure seemed to have missed the entire point of my last few posts' (there's a reason that, in my first post addressed to you in this thread, I differentiated between 1) loco-motion, 2) the initiation of activity, and 3) the idea of activity). But hey, that's your prerogative.
     
    1) Loco-motion is irrelevant, because I didn't say that ''legs'' by themselves could ''walk'' independently from a brain. 2) ''Initiation'' is also irrelevant, because ''walking'' and the ''initiation'' of ''walking'' (which merely means ''to begin walking'') are one in the same, but, added to that, if the example were correct, then there would not be an ''initiator'' to begin with. 3) I don't even know what you mean by the ''idea'' of activity, but I'm going to assume it's irrelevant too.
     
    Lol, no discernible reason? Okay, if this really is so, as you claim, Mr. smart guy, answer me this: can you describe to me an object's (let alone a "physical" one's) being without referencing attributes rooted in, and discerned by, sensory-experience (i.e., sensations)? I'll wait.....
     
    Yes, there is literally no coherent reason why one should think of physical objects as mere ''bundles of perceptions'', but to answer your question, no.. but having an experience of a physical object does not mean that whether that object exists or not hinges on your experience of it.
     
  11. Nigga walked the plank, but maybe he'll respond with his 4th account.^
     
  12. I believe that the brain is like a container for your mind, and keeps everything you have held from past experiences? And, the mind is more of an everlasting brain for your spirit.
     
  13.  
    He didn't ''walk'' the plank, per se, his ''perception'' walked the plank, which is the only kind of walking the plank there is.
     
  14. I feel mind is more part of the spirit it feels connected yet separate does this make sense?


    Sent from my iPad using Grasscity Forum
     
  15. The brain is a physical organ, somewhat of a control center for the entire body. A mind is a unique collection of thoughts, which as far as we know, can only stem from a functioning brain. Therefore, the mind stems from the brain. The mind is not physical like the brain. It's just a result of one of its functions, consciousness. The mind cannot exist without brain function, like the soul cannot exist (as far as we know) without the body as a vehicle. Like another blade said, brain and body are concrete. There's little evidence that mind and soul are anything more than man-made concepts, possibly coming from our fear of our bodies deterioration, and wanting ourselves, our true selves, to be separated from our fragile bodies. To be something more important, something profound, something longer lasting, something but the bags of bones and organs that we most likely just are.
     
    Not the most interesting or elaborate theory, but my two cents.
     

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